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Abstract
When the Supreme Court grants new rights, public awareness is a crucial
part of enforcement. Gerald N. Rosenberg and Michael J. Klarman famously
criticized minority rights organizations for attempting to gain new rights
through the judiciary. The crux of their argument relied heavily on the American
media’s scanty coverage of Court issues and subsequent low public awareness of
Court cases. Using the 2013 United States v. Windsor and Hollingsworth v. Perry
rulings as a case study, I suggest that the media environment has changed so
much since Rosenberg and Klarman were writing that their theories warrant
reconsideration. Minority rights groups now have access to social media, a
potentially powerful tool with which to educate the public about the Supreme
Court and new rights granted by the Court.
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Introduction
The Supreme Court has few enforcement powers. When the Court grants
new rights (for instance, the right of women to choose abortion, the right of black
Americans to attend the school of their choosing, or the right of same-sex couples
to be recognized by certain federal laws) they must rely on elected officials to
enforce those rights through policy. They must rely on the public to recognize
these rights and assimilate them into a changed culture. Only then is social
change possible. The extensive resources that interest groups spend on litigation
for new rights cannot be explained unless advocates believe that the Court is able
to bestow benefits outside of immediate and direct policy change – legitimacy,
press coverage, influence over elected officials, etc. These extra-judicial effects are
a substantial part of the benefits advocacy groups are seeking.
Nearly all of these extra-judicial effects are abetted by press coverage of
Supreme Court decisions. Unfortunately, Court news has traditionally been
scarce, facile and often inaccurate. The media remains, however, one of the only
publically accessible sources of information on the Court. If the resources
advocates spend on litigation are to bestow the benefits they’re seeking, public
awareness of Court cases must be a priority. The rise of new media may present
a unique opportunity for advocates to educate the public about cases before the
bar and increase public awareness.
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The two most prominent critics of litigation strategies for new rights are
Gerald Rosenberg and Michael J. Klarman. Rosenberg and Klarman both
famously argued that the resources spent on litigation strategies to secure new
rights are, at best, ineffectual and at worst, counterproductive. Klarman focused
his scholarship on the counterproductive aspects of litigation for new rights, first
using Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka (1954) as an exemplar of his
“backlash” thesis (Klarman 1994). He argues that instead of integrating schools
as it was meant to, Brown I and II “propelled southern politics dramatically to the
right on racial issues” (Klarman 1994, p. 11).
In Rosenberg’s book, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social
Change? the answer to the eponymous question is “Not really”. Rosenberg
expanded on the idea of the inefficacy of new rights litigation, concerned less
with backlash than with the idea that these kinds of cases just don’t accomplish
much and that advocacy groups would be better off spending their resources on
legislative strategies. Focusing on a number of landmark Supreme Court cases,
Rosenberg began his analysis with an examination of the effects of Brown. His
work became well known, in part, because a portion of his thesis was nearly
unassailable - Brown did not increase the number of integrated schools. If the
goal of Brown was proximal social change, Klarman and Rosenberg show that its
failure is significant and measurable.
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There are, of course, more complicated effects of Court decisions – those
beyond immediate, direct and numerical outcomes. Klarman and Rosenberg had
a more difficult time measuring these effects, and a significant body of criticism
exists taking one or both of them to task for their poor methodology and easy
dismissal of these phenomena (See, for instance, Garrow 1994 & Meyer &
Boutcher 2007 & most famously, McCann 1992). Particularly at issue is whether
Supreme Court rulings provide important symbolic utility: causing movements
to cohere, creating legitimacy for new rights causes, expanding public
conversation, influencing public officials and accelerating the timeline for policy
gains at the legislative and executive levels. In the context of Brown, Klarman and
Rosenberg both aver that there is no evidence that the decision did anything
other than to align the conservative South more vehemently in favor of
segregation and delay integration until 1964 when the Civil Rights Act was
passed through the legislature, all the while wasting the limited resources of
advocacy groups like the National Association for the Advancement of Colored
People (NAACP).
Though a commonly accepted interpretation of Brown is that it was an
enormous symbolic victory for civil rights activists and subsequently motivated
them to adopt a more aggressive equal-rights strategy, Klarman writes that
Brown “…was a relatively unimportant motivating factor for the civil rights
movement”(1994, p. 82). For his part, Rosenberg writes of the ruling “While it
must be the case that Court action influenced some people, I have found no
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evidence that this influence was widespread or of much importance to the battle
for civil rights”(2008, p. 156). It’s all well and good, they want to say, to presume
that the Court influences policy in the ephemeral sphere of extra-judicial effects
but where those effects can actually be measured, proof of their existence is
lackluster.
Klarman and Rosenberg’s work has affected much subsequent scholarship
on the Court. Even the most theoretical work discussing the Supreme Court and
social change must at least acknowledge the arguments made by Klarman and
Rosenberg, even if their theses are eventually rebutted or dismissed. Crucial to
both authors’ argument is that the public learns from the media. If the media do
not report substantially on Supreme Court opinions, the public cannot be
counted on to know about or understand Court decisions and the issues
surrounding them. Therefore, Rosenberg and Klarman argue, media coverage of
Supreme Court cases is necessary to achieve symbolic or extra-judicial effects.
The bottom line: the media teaches the public about the Supreme Court and the
awareness they create is essential to the ability of the Court to effect social
change.
Rosenberg attributes a large portion of Brown’s purported failure to a lack
of media attention. “There is no evidence of…an increase or major change in
reporting in the years immediately following Brown. In general, newspaper
coverage of civil rights was poor until the massive demonstrations of the 1960s”
(Rosenberg 1995, p. 111). Klarman attributes progress in black civil rights to the
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Montgomery bus boycotts and related violence in the South rather than the
Brown decisions, largely due to the fact that the media covered the boycotts and
not the Supreme Court rulings. He wrote,
“analyses of print media coverage of civil rights ‘events’ suggest that court
decisions, including Brown, attracted relatively little attention as compared with
demonstrations producing confrontation and violence, such as the Montgomery
bus boycott…The New York Times actually provided greater coverage to civil
rights issues in 1952 than in 1954 or 1955 [when Brown I and II were decided]”
(Klarman 1994, p. 78).
It was not until the early nineties that circumstances arose that would
again test Klarman and Rosenberg’s hypotheses on litigating for new rights.
First, the Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage (SSM) in
Baehr v. Miike (1993), which ruling prompted the passing of the federal Defense
of Marriage Act and a state constitutional amendment against SSM in Hawaii.
Ten years later, the Supreme Court outlawed anti-sodomy statutes in Lawrence v.
Texas (2003), an ultimately controversial ruling despite the fact that sodomy laws
were rarely enforced. These events compelled both authors to address the
litigation strategy again, this time with regard to the new rights petitioned for by
gay advocates.
To differing degrees, both authors maintained the veracity of their theses
and both continued to stress the importance of the media with regard to
achieving desirable social effects from new rights litigation. While more recently
Klarman has refined his view in light of the enormous progress made by gayrights reformers (see his 2012 book From the Closet to the Altar where he attributes
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this progress to positive depictions of gays in the media and of more gay people
“coming out”) Rosenberg averred in his update to The Hollow Hope that news
coverage of SSM – where it existed - had been largely negative, especially during
election years. This negative coverage, he writes, is hindering the gay rights
movement and might have been avoided through a more careful, legislativebased strategy by gay advocacy groups.
In 2008, Rosenberg reiterated his thesis thusly: State and Supreme Court
decisions on gay rights failed in two important ways: the first is that state court
decisions failed to bring about gay marriage in more than a few states; in some
states litigation only managed to bring about civil unions, an arrangement
Lambda Legal and other advocate groups called a “farce”. The second is that
state court decisions on marriage and the Supreme Court decision on gay sexual
relations did not act as symbolic beacons to move public opinion, influence
public officials or mobilize advocates. If anything, Rosenberg writes, the
litigation is responsible for a “one step forward, two steps back” phenomena
wherein even though same-sex couples can count their litigation a success in
states where they now have the right to marry, they must consider that the
number of states where gays can marry are few and significantly more states
adopted constitutional amendments banning SSM in response to those gains.
Klarman simply lamented the backlash caused by SSM decisions at the
state court level and the Supreme Court decision in Lawrence. “One might have
expected a fairly mild reaction to a ruling that invalidated criminal prohibitions
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on same-sex sodomy, given that such statutes were almost never enforced
anyway. Yet the response to Lawrence quickly became acrimonious” (Klarman
2005, p. 459). Klarman goes on to say that Lawrence certainly negatively affected
the gay rights movement in the short term. Justice Scalia’s vociferous dissent in
Lawrence argued that the majority’s reasoning would create the legal
groundwork for SSM in the future. According to Klarman, conservatives rallied
around this idea, popularizing a negative conception of SSM in the media,
collecting record donations, and mobilizing the Republican Party going into the
2004 election in an effort reject civil rights for gays and lesbians.
Rosenberg and Klarman sought to establish a type of pattern at work with
new rights rulings. In Brown, the Court failed to increase the number of
integrated schools. The common impression, then, was that Brown had at least
mobilized activists and increased the salience of civil rights issues with the
American public. This widely accepted idea of the effect of the ruling was highly
dependent upon media reports of the decision since the public has few other
tools with which to learn about Court proceedings.
Rosenberg argued that the pattern of Court inefficacy continued with Roe,
which did not increase the number of legal abortions performed in its temporal
wake. Furthermore, Rosenberg found a decrease in coverage of women’s issues
in the media that year, just as Klarman had found a decrease in reporting on
segregation. “There was actually less coverage in 1973, the year of the Court’s
decision, than in the years 1972, 1971 or 1970!” (Rosenberg 2008, p. 229).
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Before 2013, the most well publicized, wide-ranging ruling dealing with
gay rights at the Supreme Court level was Lawrence, and both authors again
found that the Court was not effecting any real change and that much of this
failure could be attributed to the media. If Klarman and Rosenberg are right,
litigation strategies for new rights do not make strategic sense. They waste
resources and seem to repel public attention. An assessment of that premise in
today’s new media environment is best considered in the context of two recent
Supreme Court cases Hollingsworth v. Perry (2013) and U.S. v. Windsor (2013).
Perry allowed a 2010 California state court ruling against the voterapproved Proposition Eight (which law prohibited SSM) to stand, paving the
way for the largest state in the union to recognize SSM. In a more substantial
decision, Windsor overturned Section III of the federal Defense of Marriage Act
(DOMA), a clause that was written as follows:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies
of the United States, the word 'marriage' means only a legal union between one
man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word 'spouse' refers only to a
person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife. (DOMA, §3:1996)
If the fallout from these cases mirrored that of previous landmark cases,
there are several indicators that we would want to look for. First, we would
expect to see little increase in positive media coverage, especially given that the
decisions were not handed down in an election year. If there were little media
coverage, research should consequently show relatively low awareness and
	
  

8	
  

comprehensive understanding of Windsor and Perry among the general public. If
there was negative attention paid to the case, we might have expected public
opinion on the issue of same-sex marriage to become more negative as well. But
the evidence available defies each of these predictions in the particular instance
of the Windsor and Perry cases. .
In the gay-marriage cases, as I will illustrate in Chapter II, polling
indicates that awareness is considerable and substantive. Media attention was
prodigious and sustained. Public approval of the Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual and
Transsexual (LGBT) community went down after the Lawrence decision. But it
has gone up in some demographics and remained steady in others since the 2013
SSM rulings. What could account for the exceptional social outcomes of these
cases? I believe that in the decade between Lawrence and the Windsor and Perry
rulings, the largest single change in the relationship between the Court and the
public has been the rise of social media and its influence on how the public
consumes news about the Court.
Social media or social networking sites (SNS) allow users to generate or
share their own content among the public or a loose network of friends, family,
coworkers and acquaintances. Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and Instagram are
some of the most popular SNS websites, each having increased its number of
users every year since their inception. Social media creates unprecedented
opportunities for people to reach one another and for different methods of
activism to be implemented while expending relatively few resources. If public
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awareness of judicial policymaking is important to our democracy and to the
functioning and legitimacy of the Court - or, if we are simply interested in the
Court’s ability to enact and enforce social change - we should be empirically
enticed by SNS as a wholly new vector for Court-public interaction.
If it is true that social media can positively impact public awareness of
new rights Court cases, then advocacy groups will be benefited in a number of
ways. On the one hand, social media allows advocacy groups to push their
messages to a much broader audience than traditional media allow and its use is
typically free or inexpensive. Social media also allows organizations to frame
their own efforts and disputes, allowing gains in public opinion. Lastly, it may
help mitigate the critiques Rosenberg and Klarman put forth with regard to
litigation strategies. Though Facebook this year celebrated its tenth anniversary
and Twitter was launched eight years ago, research into whether social media
can increase public awareness of Court decisions is currently scarce.

Media, Court Awareness & Why It Matters

Rosenberg, writing originally in 1991, could of course not be expected to
take into account the rise of new media. Even in 2008, when his update was
published, social media was still in its infancy. In the update, Rosenberg renewed
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his objection to court-based strategies for new rights with regard to gay
advocates and their attempt to gain the right to marry through judicial means.
He wrote that litigation was a bad strategy in 1954 and it remained so in 2008; the
Court’s decisions created no measurable, positive extra-judicial effects for blacks
in the 50s, women in the 70s or homosexuals in the late 90s and early 2000s.
There are a few components to this argument but the basis of nearly all of
them resides in the media’s presentation and discussion of Court decisions.
Whether scholars measure if news outlets made any mention of Court decisions
and the issues surrounding them, or what the tenor of that coverage was, media
plays a powerful role in the creation and calculation of the extra-judicial effects
of Court decisions.
Plainly, a Court opinion cannot change or legitimize your view of the
issue at hand, educate elites about changes in the law or act as a potent symbol of
change if you are unaware of the existence and content of the decision. This quite
logical understanding forms the basis of much of Rosenberg’s dismissal of extrajudicial, symbolic effects. Political scientists “know” that awareness of Supreme
Court proceedings is low. While brushing off Court efficacy based on this lack of
public awareness, Rosenberg wrote, “…it seems likely that if more than half the
American public didn’t know about Roe [v. Wade], then at least that percentage
wouldn’t know about other, less famous, Court decisions” (1991, p. 236).
This reasoning is in line with most studies on Supreme Court influence
and public opinion, which regularly presuppose that the public simply does not
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find the Court very noteworthy and that awareness of Court rulings is usually
meager (Casey 1977).
“One of the old chestnuts of political science is that the American mass public is
remarkably ignorant of courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court. For instance,
an oft-cited survey in 1989 reported that 71% of the respondents could not name
a single member of the Supreme Court; in contrast, 54% of the same sample was
able to name the judge on the television show ‘The People's Court’” (Gibson &
Caldeira 2009, p. 429).
Another poll conducted in 2006 showed that more Americans could name the
Seven Dwarves than the nine sitting Supreme Court justices (Zogby
International). The idea that the public lives their lives largely unaware of even
major Supreme Court decisions is overwhelmingly popular. “In general, surveys
have shown that only about 40 percent of the American public, at best, follows
Supreme Court actions, as measured by respondents having either read or heard
something about the Court” (Rosenberg 1991, p. 236 emphasis added). The
implication, of course, is that having heard or read something about the Court is
a fairly low threshold to meet and can only be termed “awareness” in the very
loosest sense.
Some scholars object to this characterization of the public, offering that
polls on public awareness of the Courts are poorly conducted, asking questions
out of context, scoring mostly correct answers nil, and generally failing to
accurately capture what people really know about the Court (Gibson & Caldeira
2009). Other critics contend that national polling does not give an accurate
representation of local pockets of interest.
	
  

12	
  

“If citizens learn about different Court decisions based on information available
and salient to them, then looking for uniform national effect is misguided. This
does not mean that Court decisions are without national effect. If the Court’s
effect is more localized – either in terms of geography or some other process – we
might still see the effect of Court decisions on public opinion…the process is just
more subtle and possibly more gradual” (Hoekstra 2003, p. 105).
But Supreme Court proceedings are relatively clandestine, at least compared to
the legislative and executive branches of government. Proceedings remain untelevised and un-photographed. Justices typically stay out of the press once
they’ve been confirmed. Ordinarily, only landmark cases on controversial issues
are covered by the media (and then only cursorily) – this compared with the
almost obsessive attention paid to the executive and certain personalities in the
legislature. If the general public are uninformed about the Court as a majority of
scholars take them to be, the public can be forgiven to a certain extent inasmuch
as information on the judicial branch is relatively less available.
It should be noted that scholarly distress over whether the public is aware
of the Court and its decisions originates from a few different places. The first is
discomfort with the Courts as a branch of our representative democracy (Hall &
McGuire 2005; Mondak & Smithey 1997; Slotnick & Segal 1998). Some argue that
because the Court has the power to overturn democratically arrived-at
conclusions about public policy, they ought not to operate in the shadows of
public awareness (Gibson & Caldiera 2009).
“In democratic political systems, the interaction and communication between
political elites and institutions and the mass public are considered of primary
importance. Because democratic governments are established to serve their
citizens, the flow of information between elites and masses is critical to the
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functioning of these governments and to their perceived legitimacy”(Slotnick &
Segal 1998, p. 1).
A second concern has to do with constitutional interpretation. Proponents
of judicial supremacy concern themselves with which branch of government
ought to bear the ultimate responsibility for deciphering constitutional meaning.
They believe that the Court, shielded from the vicissitudes of electoral politics
and peopled with experts in law, should have the “final say” in constitutional
matters. For the Court to have the final say – or any say at all - requires a certain
attention to Court decisions on the part of the public and their elected officials.
Enforcement, outside of court settings, requires awareness. A third concern also
pertains to enforcement. It is the misgiving voiced by Klarman and Rosenberg;
how can the Court influence public policy or create social change if the public is
unaware of its rulings? “…Court decisions cannot be viewed as legitimate or be
effectively enforced if the public and policy makers are uninformed or
misinformed” (Haider-Markel et. al. 2006, p. 65).
Though these concerns originate from different scholarly positions and
belief systems, all revolve in some way around matters of legitimacy. Democratic
legitimacy, the legitimacy granted by the executive and legislative branches of
government (who have equal claim to constitutional interpretation), and
legitimacy in the body public. Simple awareness of the Court as an institution
can breed legitimacy and public support for the Court (Gibson, Caldeira, & Baird
1998; Ramirez 2008; Farganis 2012). Awareness of Court decisions makes
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enforcement of those decisions more likely and may even move public opinion
towards that of the Court’s (Mondak 1994; Grosskopf & Mondak 1998; Hoekstra
1995). Legitimacy is the currency of the Supreme Court; without it the Court
cannot function and groups seeking social justice through the judiciary are
effectively hobbled.
Given this understanding, it is somewhat alarming that we’ve entrusted
the media to educate the public about the Court for so long. The media have not
borne this responsibility particularly well (Heatherington & Smith 2007; Slotnick
& Segal 1998; Davis 1994). Mainstream press coverage of the Court is episodic,
overwhelmingly focused on civil liberties and First Amendment issues and,
worst, often just plain wrong (Graber 1993; Franklin & Kosaki 1993; Slotnick &
Segal 1998). Unfortunately, critiques of court coverage have “…not translated
into effective study of the impact of that media coverage, leaving scholars to do
little more than speculate on the relationship between media coverage and
diffuse support for the Supreme Court” (Scott & Saunders 2006, p. 7). So, despite
the media’s unwieldy control of such an important aspect of democracy and
government, studies on media coverage of the Court are rare.
Traditionally, advocates attempting to subvert the mainstream media’s
hold over their stories have relied on boycotts, protests and other civil resistance.
Efforts in mainstream newspapers or television were relegated to op-eds or paid
ads. In fact, gay rights advocates have long been hamstrung by mainstream
media’s portrayal of homosexuals and their ostensive agenda. Now, however,
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with the advent of user-directed social media, supporters and proponents have a
new media venue to disseminate information about the influence of adverse laws
on their lives, potential means of changing those laws and subsequent legal
decisions. New media has begun to change the way the Court and the public
interact.
Like nearly every scholar conducting media studies before social media
came to dominate how we access news, Rosenberg clearly regarded media as a
hierarchical phenomenon - elites create media and then people consume it. In
describing why he based the media analysis in his update on the New York Times,
he wrote,
“The Times is a good choice for several reasons. First, it is known as an agendasetter for other newspapers and media outlets around the country. If the Times
carries a story or covers a topic, it signals that the topic is worthy of attention.
Second, the Times is read by elites and opinion-setters...” (Rosenberg 2008, p. 385)
Rosenberg (rightly) expects that information about the Court will trickle
downward to the public. However, agenda-setting (discussed below) is now a
more complex interaction between mainstream media and social media activity.
New media is, by its definition, not necessarily hierarchical but rather usergenerated. People participate in making the news, annotating the links they
forward, adding personal observations, commenting on news websites and often
“breaking” stories on the web, scooping the mainstream press who are then
motivated to seize the story and expand on it.
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Social media is now the number one driver of news stories on the web.
The New York Times now funnels its stories almost exclusively through social
media, just like most other media outlets.
“In the last twelve months, traffic from home pages has dropped significantly
across many websites while social media's share of clicks has more than doubled,
according to a 2013 review of the BuzzFeed Partner Network, a conglomeration
of popular sites including BuzzFeed, the New York Times, and Thought Catalog.
Facebook, in particular, has opened the spigot, with its outbound links to
publishers growing from 62 million to 161 million in 2013” (Thompson 2014, p.
1).
As a result of this (and other technological happenstance), journalists rarely
create search engine optimized (SEO) stories any longer. This indicates a
reduction in the number of people who use Google or other search engines to
search for news items of interest to them. Search engine traffic generated by
social media posts is a new part of the information cycle, the breadth of which is
difficult to know. The local newspaper, or even newspaper home websites are no
longer responsible for the bulk of the news that people consume. Instead, people
often subscribe to newsfeeds and they share stories among their family, friends
and coworkers.
The impact of this change in terms of what news and opinion people
access is potentially important for social scientists. Some scholars assert that the
newsfeed structure of social media increases the range of opinions and
information one is exposed to, even given a person’s tendency to subscribe only
to those media that support the user’s worldview (An et. al. 2011). Even those
who get the bulk of their information from traditional news sources often
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supplement that material with forays onto social websites (Pew Research Center
2013). The relationship between traditional news elites and the public has
changed. The media are still powerful providers of information and spin but the
relatively more democratic and accessible aspects of social media must be
considered.

Extra-Judicial Effects & Their Measurement

As stated above, public awareness of Court decisions is crucial in order for
rights groups to gain the benefits of extra-judicial effects. What are we measuring
when we measure Court efficacy? If it were simply the number of desegregated
schools or legal abortions or states where SSM is permitted, the Court would
often look undisputedly ineffectual. But new rights Court cases are responsible
for a number of complex cultural and political effects, which I will simplify a
great deal and summarize below.
According to Rosenberg there are two main competing theories about the
function of the Court. He calls these the Constrained Court and Dynamic Court
theories. Constrained Court theorists take their queue from Alexander
Hamilton’s famous assertion that the Court is the “least dangerous” branch of
government, controlling neither “the sword nor the purse”. In their view, courts
cannot bring about social change because they are too constrained by their
connections to and reliance on the other branches of government to do so.
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Conversely, Dynamic Court theorists believe that the courts are uniquely
situated to bring about social change. In their view the accessibility of the
litigation process combined with the relative shelter the courts maintain from the
vicissitudes of politics make courts ideal for protecting minorities from
majorities. Though Rosenberg coined these terms, the Constrained and Dynamic
Court theories do represent two common schools of thought in legal literature
and they are helpful for my purposes inasmuch as they employ a simple
reference to otherwise large and unwieldy bodies of scholarly work.
Important to understanding the Constrained and Dynamic Court theories
is the recognition that these theories, as employed by Rosenberg, are used first
and foremost to explain the Court’s ability to directly effect change. The
constraints that inhibit Court efficacy according to Rosenberg’s summation of the
work in this field are the following: (1) The narrow nature of what may be
considered a constitutional question able to be resolved by law. Standing
doctrine and other hurdles to Court access are said to greatly confine which
issues the Court will address. (2) That the Court lacks the independence
necessary to achieve effective change. The political debts of appointed judges
and the amount of deference the judiciary is required to lend to the legislature in
order to maintain their legitimacy make truly revolutionary rulings extremely
unlikely. (3) That the Court cannot implement proper incentives or costs to truly
change policy.
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According to Rosenberg’s summation of Dynamic Court theory, the above
constraints can be overcome when other political or market actors are able to
fashion appropriate incentives to implement Court policy or when the Court can
provide cover for political actors who wish to implement policy but lack the
political capital to do so. Rosenberg sets up a complicated rubric whereby a
certain combination of the above constraints can be overcome by a balancing
environment of favorable conditions. Only under very narrow conditions, he
wants to say, may the Court implement direct, proximal social change.
However, whether these conditions have been met is beyond the scope of
my argument here. As Rosenberg notes, these conditions bear mostly on the
direct effects of Supreme Court rulings. Brown, he argues, could not meet these
conditions – could not provide proper incentives to propel reluctant officials to
act, was not aided by politicians who were willing to carry out the Court’s
direction under the shelter of their political cover. But the failure of Brown to
meet the conditional requirements Rosenberg sets out for change, or even if they
were able to immediately achieve integration, does not close the question of
whether Brown was crucial to the civil rights movement, whether it brought
black civil rights to the attention of the white public, etc. The constraints and
conditions rubric he sets up do not address extra-judicial effects.
My interest is in the extra-judicial effects the Supreme Court can bring
about by virtue of its status, institutional situation and legitimacy – specifically
when granting new rights. According to Rosenberg, the Constrained Court
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theory, even if it can explain why schools did not desegregate immediately after
Brown or why legal abortions did not increase after Roe is almost always
countered with the Dynamic Court theory’s stock response – that the Court has
indirect influence. “The judicial path to influence is not the only way an
institution can take in contributing to civil rights. As the Dynamic Court view
suggest, by bringing an issue to light courts may put pressure on others to act,
sparking change” (Rosenberg 1991, p. 107).
Even granting the most favorable interpretation of the Constrained Court
theory, the Dynamic Court argument of the existence of extra-judicial effects is
left hanging, unanswered unless one undertakes a thorough measurement of the
processes and outcomes of extra-judicial influence. It is these extra-judicial
phenomena that I will attempt to measure below.
Though Rosenberg does not find evidence to support the Dynamic Court
view, he does offer a fairly comprehensive list of what, beyond jurisprudence,
proponents of social change through the courts want to see when the Court
grants new rights. Importantly, he also suggests objective ways to measure these
effects and how we might attribute them directly to Court decisions rather than
to societal evolution alone.
The first of these extra-judicial effects Rosenberg calls salience. The Court
can bring attention to an issue through the press, making the issue more
noticeable or important. Again using Brown as an example, Rosenberg wrote that
from the Dynamic viewpoint “…one important way in which the Court may
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have given salience to civil rights is through inducing increased press coverage
of it and balanced treatment of blacks” (Rosenberg 1991, p. 111).
In literature on the Court, the term “salience” is used frequently and
carries different implied connotations. It may mean the importance of the issue to
the public before the justices ruled on it (Epstein & Segal 2000), the importance of
the Court and its rulings in general (Murphey & Tanenhause 1969) or the
perceived gravity of the problem before the Court by the public (Iyengar &
Kinder 1986; Franklin & Kosaki 1989). Rosenberg is using the word “salience” to
refer to the relevance of the dispute to the public and, specifically, to the Court’s
ability to make the problem more trenchant to the public by drawing attention to
it. That is the definition I will use as well. The press is an important intermediary
in the process of creating this type of salience. Put succinctly, “media coverage
increases salience” (Franklin & Kosaki 1989, p. 767). To argue that the Court has
increased the salience of a problem among those who may not have considered it
very carefully prior to the Court’s involvement one must be able to measure an
increased focus on the dispute in the press. In this manner, salience is fairly
simple to measure and it presupposes that the more a topic is in the media, the
more important the public will think it is.
The second of these effects is elite influence. The stature of the Supreme
Court brings their influence to bear on the elected branches of government,
forcing them to act and thereby generating social change. In general, elites are
more attuned to Supreme Court decisions than the general public (Mondak &
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Smithey 1997). If Rosenberg is correct and the media did not focus on Brown,
Dynamic Court theorists expect that elected officials must have. In their view, the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 would not have been passed if Brown had not preceded
it. Rosenberg believes that one should be able to measure this type of influence
by the legislative records, hearings and statements of lawmakers, or what he calls
“attribution”. He claims that no legislators attributed their support of the 1964
Civil Rights Act to the decade-old Brown decision. Instead, politicians argued
that it was necessary to stem violence in the South, that it should be passed in
tribute to John F. Kennedy who had supported the bill and who had recently
been assassinated, and various other reasons. The lawmakers’ own words,
Rosenberg argues, are the best and really only way that we can objectively
measure the influence of Court cases on future legislation.
Next, there is the influence the Court has on public opinion. There is a
substantial literature on the Supreme Court’s ability to sway public opinion, but
briefly, the Dynamic theory holds that the courts play an “…important role in
alerting Americans to social and political grievances” (Rosenberg 1991, p. 125).
There are four essential theories as to how the Court may affect public opinion.
The first of these is the legitimation hypothesis or what is sometimes called the
positive response hypothesis. This theory states that the Supreme Court is held in
high esteem, thus public opinion will shift in the direction of the Court’s as
people respond to their leadership. “[T]hrough their opinions, the courts can
instruct the public…” (Franklin & Kosaki 1989, p. 751).
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The second model of the Court’s influence on public opinion is the
structural response hypothesis. Under this rubric, some citizens will respond in
keeping with the legitimation hypothesis, but others won’t. Those that don’t are
likely to become more entrenched in their own opinions, opinions that war with
the Court’s decision (Franklin & Kosaki 1989).
Thirdly, the thermostatic model has traditionally been applied to policy
issued from elected branches of government. It states that as liberal policy
accumulates, the public’s demand for liberal policy is sated and eventually
preferences change. The public subsequently prefers conservative policy choices
until those accumulate and so forth. When applied to Court-made policy, the
thermostatic model substantiates Klarman’s backlash theory since it predicts a
“negative relationship between the ideological direction of the Court’s decisions
and changes in public mood” (Ura 2012, p. 1).
Lastly, there exists the conditional response hypothesis, which suggests that
the Court can influence public opinion but only given certain conditions
(Stoutenborough et. al. 2006). Valerie Hoekstra (2003) has made further
refinements to the conditional response hypothesis. Her thesis mostly
recapitulates the conditional response hypothesis but with the important added
dimension of locality (i.e. the local importance hypothesis). She argues that certain
issues are important to certain localities and that those localities will respond
differently to Court decisions than the general public. The geographical area
most affected by the case or where the primaries in the case originate from
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should, she argues, have more intense interest in the debate and – crucially – will
be exposed to more media coverage thereof.
Rosenberg seems to have supposed that Dynamic Court theorists would
be most likely to advance the legitimation hypothesis. Therefore, he suggests
measuring public opinion after a decision is handed down. After Brown, he
argues, public opinion towards blacks did not substantially improve.
Legitimation, he avers, did not take place. Even given a belief in one of the other
theories of SCOTUS influence on the public, each requires a comparison of
existing public opinion on an issue before and after a Court ruling.
The last extra-judicial effect that I will mention is what I call coherence. The
Supreme Court, by legitimizing the grievances of minorities, causes their
movements to cohere (Meyer & Boutcher 2007). By this logic, one effect of Brown
was the Montgomery bus boycott and the belief among blacks that they could
expect more from their government, something beyond “separate but equal”
(Coleman et. al. 2005; Garrow 1994; Keck 2009). A win at the Supreme Court level
can allow advocacy groups to collect money, it can lead a fractured minority
populace to come together in order to fight for a newly achievable goal and win
advocates from non-minority populations. Cohesion can be measured by
increased fundraising earmarked for particular new rights issues, new coalitions
formed to fight for the new right, or civic protests attributed to the ruling by the
activists involved.
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Rosenberg and Klarman both claimed to have found no evidence of either
salience or coherence effects from the Brown decision.
“The Dynamic Court view’s claim that a major contribution of the courts in civil
rights was to give the issue salience, press political elites to act, prick the
consciences of whites, legitimate the grievances of blacks, and fire blacks up to
act is not substantiated. In all the places examined, where evidence supportive of
the claim should exist, it does not” (Rosenberg 1991, p. 156).
Klarman wrote, “the conventional view is that Brown instigated racial change
either by pricking the conscience of northern whites or by raising the hopes and
expectations of southern blacks. I shall suggest…that surprisingly little evidence
supports either of these claims…” (Klarman 1994, p. 11). Of course, their
conclusions have been disputed.
Those who disagree with Rosenberg and Klarman have suggested a
number of reasons and ways in which their methodology was flawed or
incomplete. One writer contended that Rosenberg’s “wholly unpersuasive” claim
that Brown had little to no impact on black civil rights was “disproved by a
credible and copious scholarly literature” so much so that “no further rejoinder is
required” (Garrow 1994, p. 152). Others are more moderate, suggesting that
some combination of extra-judicial effects from Brown combined with protests in
the South sparked the civil rights movement (Coleman et. al. 2005).
At any given point on the spectrum between the assertion that extrajudicial effects do not exist in any measurable way or that they not only exist but
that we can assess them and credit them with our country’s civil rights advances,
the effects listed above are what scholars are looking to evaluate. It’s fair to say
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that at least one of them need be present in order for the Supreme Court to
influence social change. Tellingly, each effect requires some measure of
awareness, which in turn requires the participation of the media in publicizing
the Court’s actions.

My interest is in beginning to piece together how social media may impact
public awareness of the Court and therefore the Court’s ability to create social
change through extra-judicial effects. To illustrate the relationship between the
Court, the media and the public, I will use the recent Windsor and Perry decisions
as a case study. This preliminary effort will proceed in three parts. In the first
chapter, I will examine the relationship between media and public awareness.
Partially out of necessity and partially to lay a solid groundwork, much of this
discussion will revolve around accepted theories about the relationship between
traditional media and the public. I will show that, though research regarding the
effects of new media on the public are scarcer and less robust, we should expect
the fundamental relationship between the public and the media to remain the
same in certain important respects, however the media is consumed.
In the second chapter I will examine the Windsor and Perry decisions and
their impact on public awareness, which I contend is the result of a focused and
lengthy social media campaign. Briefly, I examined social media activity on
several sites during the 2013 Supreme Court term and compared the amount of
activity with subsequent polls on public knowledge and opinion.
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In chapter three, I will discuss what I believe new media means in relation
to the larger issues of Court awareness, legitimacy and deployment of extrajudicial effects. I will conclude by outlining questions for future research.
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Chapter I. The Relationship Between Media & Public Awareness

Distilled to its essence, and in general terms, scholars should expect to see
a few effects from increased media coverage of any given topic: 1. That the public
will become more aware of the topic through exposure (Curran & Iyengar et. al.
2009; Holder & Treno 1997; Iyengar et. al. 1982; McCombs & Shaw 1972; Tichenor
et. al. 1970) 2. That the public should be relatively more informed about the
covered topic than about other, less-covered topics (Curran et. al. 2009;
McCombs & Shaw 1972) and 3. That the tenor of the coverage, how the issue is
framed, will induce effects that can be measured in terms of public opinion
(Druckman 2001; Cappella & Jamieson 1996; Chong & Druckman 2007; Gamson
& Modigliani 1989; Nelson & Kinder 1996).
There are all sorts of potential caveats and addenda to be made about the
causal patterns at work, the type and depth of the information the public
receives, etc. But for my purposes here, I want to cover the basic relationship
between media coverage and public awareness and opinion. As I will
demonstrate, increased media coverage of Supreme Court cases can be linked
with increased knowledge about those decisions. Increased knowledge can lead
to the extra-judicial effects that Rosenberg dismissed with regard to litigating for
new rights: legitimizing the issue at bar, providing momentum for activists and
inspiring public officials to act. I am looking to highlight one mechanism that
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may explain why the Windsor and Perry cases see to have successfully avoided
the pitfalls Klarman and Rosenberg worried would be the result of a litigation
strategy. The importance of media in creating awareness and, subsequently,
extra-judicial effects is paramount. We consume media differently in 2014 and
therefore we must revisit the ability of the Court to stimulate social change.

How Media Influences the Public

Traditionally, the media are thought to perform three basic functions in
affecting public opinion. These are agenda-setting, priming and framing
(Iyengar, Peters & Kinder 1982; Iyengar & Kinder 1987; Iyengar & Simon 1993;
Behr & Iyengar 1985). The premise of agenda-setting is supported by a vast and
methodologically diverse body of literature but its crux is that media
concentration on certain topics causes the public to perceive those matters as
more consequential. Coined by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw, agendasetting turns on how people access information about the political sphere. They
wrote, “the information in the mass media becomes the only contact many have
with politics” (McCombs & Shaw 1972, p. 176). In other words, and to
paraphrase Bernard Cohen (1963), the media does not necessarily tell people
what to think but it does tell people what to think about.
Regularly conducted surveys on what issues the American public feels are
most pressing show that the answers change relatively swiftly over time, that no
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one topic remains at the forefront of the public’s agenda for long. Agenda-setting
theory judges that the most plausible explanation for the ebb and flow of salient
matters in the public realm is the attention accorded to them by the media. It is
vital to the theory that scholars suss out the cause and effect of this relationship.
To that end, researchers have focused on whether it can be shown that the media
follow the public’s lead, reporting on those topics favored by the public or
whether it is the reverse.
Studies on traditional media sources (television news, newspapers and
news magazines) have shown relatively conclusively that the relationship
between the media’s agenda and the public’s is unidirectional. Laboratory
experiments conducted by Iyengar and Kinder (1987) offer some of the best
evidence of this directionality. In their experiment, they manipulated the content
of news broadcasts and found that relatively small exposure to news coverage of
a particular issue was sufficient to create significant shifts in viewers’ beliefs
about the relative importance of various subjects (Iyengar & Simon 1993). Realworld situations offer further evidence for the unidirectional orientation. For
example, in the 1990s, reporting on crime increased at a time when crime
statistics were decreasing significantly (Ghanem 1996). Consequently, the public
reported that crime was a more worrying problem for the country than crime
statistics would actually indicate.
The amount of emphasis the press placed on a subject also affected the
public’s interest in that subject. Lead stories and front page news items have been
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found to influence the public’s perception of what is important much more so
than less-emphasized news items (Iyengar & Simon 1993; McCombs & Shaw
1972). “One should not necessarily conclude, however, that nonlead stories do
not affect the public agenda. A more plausible interpretation is that the
audience's attention span dissipates rapidly and that the impact of news stories
diminishes with their placement in the newscast” (Behr & Iyengar 1985, p. 49).
The second function media performs with regard to public opinion is
priming. Priming describes a phenomena where the media help create the criteria
upon which public officials are judged. There is some debate within social and
cognitive science as to whether priming (and also framing, see below) is its own
phenomena or whether it is a subset of agenda-setting (Iyengar & Kinder 1993;
Scheufele 2000; Scheufele & Tewksbury 2007). This matters for my purposes only
insofar as certain research into priming has been subsumed into the larger body
of research into agenda-setting and to the extent that the ideas are intertwined or
inseparable.
Priming as a concept stems from seminal studies into heuristics
(Kahneman & Tversky 1973). Heuristics allow people to substitute convenient
reasoning for actual reasoning. For instance, a person who has flipped a coin and
landed on heads three times in a row may believe it is more probable that they
will land on tails the next time the coin is flipped, though of course the odds are
fifty-fifty for each toss. This type of reasoning, associated with recency, is called
the availability heuristic. “A person is said to employ the availability heuristic
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whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the ease with which instances
or associations could be brought to mind” (Kahneman & Tversky 1973, p. 208).
Priming, like heuristics, has its root in availability. Human reasoning
requires cognitive shortcuts that access the most recent stimuli or whatever
comes to mind most readily. In this manner, media can affect the criteria on
which public officials or institutions are judged. “For example, individuals
exposed to news stories about defense policy tend to base their overall approval
of the president on their assessment of the president's performance on defense”
(Druckman & Holmes 2004, p. 757). It is easy to see why many scholars believe
framing to be a subset of agenda-setting research. Exposure to media stories not
only influences which matters the public believe are important but also which
information will be most accessible when they form judgments about the actors
involved in the matter. An upsurge in war coverage will move the public not
only to adjudge that the war in question is of increased importance to the nation
but it will also cause the public to judge its elected officials weighted more
heavily with regard to their performance in the realm of foreign policy.
Lastly, the media affect public opinion through framing. “For nearly half of
a century, social scientists have shown that citizens' political judgments often
depend on how an issue or problem is framed” (Druckman 2001, p. 225).
Framing is quite powerful in that it essentially creates mental perceptions
through psychological, neurobiological and sociological functions. Like priming,
it is often viewed as a subset of agenda-setting. Most simply, framing refers to
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the processes by which people conceptualize an idea. Humans, of course, hold
differing opinions on different dimensions of any given problem. How the
problem is framed – meaning which dimension of the problem is emphasized –
produces significant outcomes in opinion (Tversky & Kahneman 1981). For
instance, one researcher found that when asked if America was spending too
little on “welfare”, about 20% responded affirmatively. However, when asked
whether America was spending too little on “assistance to the poor”, 65%
responded affirmatively (Rasinski 1989).
Framing has roots in both psychology and sociology and within these
fields there are numerous controversies, classes and orders. It is easiest, however,
to think of psychological framing as dealing more with the cognitive systems
involved in thought processing and sociological framing as dealing more often
with the symbols and storylines involved in the tales we tell to each other and
through the media. Both fields deal with language, which is one reason why both
contribute to media analysis and opinion formation.
Psychological and sociological framing research both show that language
is instrumental to opinion formation. The media are responsible for publicizing
the frames we deal with every day through the language they use and the mental
images that language provokes. The “War on Terror”, “pro-life”, and “welfare
reform” are all politically constructed and media-abetted turns of phrase that
emphasize a specific dimension of the issues they represent. Activists engaged in
a fight for new rights may find themselves alternately assisted or thwarted with
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regard to public opinion by how the media frames their organizations and their
missions. “Elites wage a war of frames because they know that if their frame
becomes the dominant way of thinking about a particular problem, then the
battle for public opinion has been won” (Nelson & Kinder 1996, p. 1058). In the
case of same-sex marriage, the media moved from reporting on the topic as a
moral controversy to framing the debate as one of civil rights. The “rights” frame
is clearly more congenial to gay activists’ causes than the “morals” frame. One
could even hypothesize that this change-of-frame has been partially responsible
for helping to increase positive public opinion on same-sex marriage.
Frames are said to most strongly affect those whose political opinions are
flexible or uninformed (Chong & Druckman 2007; Tversky & Kahneman 1981).
But awareness of framing is not necessarily prophylactic. Some theories, for
instance ironic processing theory, hold that mere exposure to a frame can cause a
person to frame that issue in the same way in their own mind, whether they are
aware of doing so or not. Attempts to avoid thinking of the frame may only
make the frame more entrenched (Wegner 1994). Cognitive linguist George
Lakoff named his popular handbook on political framing Don’t Think of an
Elephant after a joke he used in his class meant to illustrate ironic process theory.
The joke, of course, is that once the word is spoken or read, an elephant comes to
mind whether you want it to or not.
Agenda-setting, priming and framing are all powerful mechanisms that
allow the media to influence public opinion and even mold one’s worldview.
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Each effect works in congress with the others and operates on variegated
elements of our cognitive capacities for political thought and reasoning. To
deliberate on public awareness, public opinion and an electorate’s ability to learn
from the media, one must reckon with these processes.

The Supreme Court, Lawrence & Media Effects

The media is the primary custodian of information about the Supreme
Court (Franklin & Kosaki 1995; Leighley 2003). For this reason, media effects
(which term I’m using to describe the aggregate results of agenda-setting,
priming and framing) are thought to be particularly potent in influencing public
opinion about the Court. Recall that agenda-setting, priming and framing, are
most effective when the listener has not formed a strong opinion about the topic
before the exposure. Mainstream reporting on the Supreme Court is typically
short-lived, episodic and shallow in depth. “Unlike other policymakers, the
Court largely leaves the framing of its decisions to others. Consequently, the
press and television play an especially pronounced role in influencing public
knowledge about the Court’s articulation of policy”(Clawson et. al. 2003, p. 785).
The power of media effects can be illuminated by an inspection of the
reporting on the Court’s decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003). Lawrence challenged
the constitutionality of a Texas anti-sodomy statute – the type of law that had
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been declared as constitutional by the Court in 1986.1 Until the decisions in
Windsor and Perry, Lawrence had been the most significant victory for gay rights
activists ever at the Supreme Court level. Sodomy laws were consistently used to
“…obstruct the passage of civil rights and liberties protections for LGBT citizens,
rule against LGBT parents in custody cases, and block LGBT officials from public
office, among other things” (Haider-Markel et. al. 2006, p. 66).
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority in Lawrence, attempted to be
circumspect about what implications the case might hold in the future for the
advancement of same-sex marriage. He wrote “the [anti-sodomy] statutes do
seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not entitled to formal
recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without being
punished as criminals” (Lawrence et. al. v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 6 [2003],
emphasis added). However, Justice Scalia, who did not vote with the majority,
made the connection in his dissent between the rationale for Lawrence and a
potential, future rationale for legalizing same-sex marriage. He wrote,
“State laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise
sustainable only in light of Bowers’ validation of laws based on moral choices.
Every single one of these laws is called into question by today’s decision; the
Court makes no effort to cabin the scope of its decision to exclude them from its
holding” (Lawrence et. al. v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 35 [2003], emphasis added).
Although future recognition of same-sex marriages was arguably a miniscule
aspect of the decision overall, the media were engrossed in this storyline. They
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
1 See Bowers v. Hardwick (1986)
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reported frequently that controversy over same-sex marriage and whether it
could now be legalized was sure to help anti-SSM politicians to overwhelming
victory in 2004 (Hillygus & Shields 2005). This media-perpetuated frame helps to
explain why a relatively non-revolutionary ruling created so much discussion
around SSM, a subject only tenuously related to the Lawrence decision.2
In 2004, George W. Bush (who had strongly supported a constitutional
amendment banning SSM) was re-elected and 11 states passed ballot measures
banning gay marriage. Thanks to a widely-reported, nationwide exit poll that
stated “moral issues” were the number one issue of importance to voters, the
media adopted the position that concern over SSM drove Bush to victory.3
Subsequent scholarship on this issue has cast serious doubts on this
assessment. In a classic example of the availability heuristic, the
contemporaneousness of the Lawrence decision to the “moral issues” poll seems
to have convinced media elites and reporters that “moral issues” was simply a
euphemism for gay marriage. Unlike the other items listed in the poll (Iraq war,
jobs, etc.), “moral issues” are not an objectively identifiable category. Further
polling, conducted by Pew Research Center in 2004, followed up with these
“moral issues” voters, asking them what the term meant to them. While 29% of
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
2 Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2003), the Massachusetts Supreme
Court decision that allowed SSM in the state also contributed to this discussion,
but much of the controversy over a constitutional amendment was driven by,
and later attributed to, Scalia’s dissent in Lawrence.
3 Thanks to this poll, conducted by Pew Research, pundits began referring to
SSM as “Issue One”.	
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those voters did answer “same-sex marriage”, nearly the same percentage, 28%
answered “abortion”. Other answers included honesty and integrity, religious
belief and “other policy issues”. Democratic candidate John Kerry’s lack of
popularity in key states was found to be attributable to a number of reasons
(foremost among them, the election basics: party identification and the economy)
but evidence for a SSM backlash having driven his success is very weak
(Hillygus & Shields 2005; Jacobs 2004).
The availability heuristic seems responsible for another popular storyline
of the 2004 election, that support for SSM-banning amendments drove more
conservative and Republican voters to the polls. During the 2004 election, 11
states passed amendments banning same-sex marriage. However, actual analysis
shows that voting on these amendments did not increase voter turnout in 2004
compared to 2000 (Smith et. al. 2006). “Further, while gay marriage was
generally cited in the media as the most likely issue behind the comparatively
ambiguous category of ‘morals/values,’ the same exit polls indicate that a
majority of voters (59%) favored either civil unions (34%) or legal marriage (25%)
for same-sex couples” (Hilygus & Shields 2005, p. 202). That Lawrence and the
state bans on SSM abutted Bush’s election temporally seems to have primed the
media to accept that they were consequently the cause of his win. Media then
passed that frame onto the public.
Nearly every piece of scholarship rebutting the presumption that Lawrence
and the specter of gay marriage drove Bush to victory blames media framing for
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perpetuating this storyline (see Hillygus & Shields 2005, Persily et. al. 2006,
Smith et. al. 2006, Langer & Cohen 2005). In reference to the crucial swing state,
Ohio, and their passage of an amendment banning same-sex marriage, one
scholar wrote,
“After the election, reporters for many national and local papers, including the
venerable New York Times, reported matter-of-factly that Issue 1 ‘helped turn out
thousands of conservative voters on Election Day’ and that support for the
measure was ‘widely viewed as having been crucial to President Bush's narrow
victory in that swing state’” (Smith et. al. 2006, p. 79).
Media framing not only shaped public perception of Lawrence but
even subsequent scholarship on the case by popularizing the notion that SSM
was the “moral” issue that pushed the Republicans to victory in 2004. As
Klarman reassessed his thesis in light of the Lawrence decision, he seems to have
taken the media frame at face value. Subsequently, much of his backlash
argument focuses on it. He wrote that “…opposition to same-sex marriage
mobilized conservative Christians to turn out at the polls in 2004 in
unprecedented numbers” (Klarman 2005, p. 467). Reasoning, as others did, that
Bush could not have won the presidency without Ohio’s electoral votes, Klarman
stated, “In closely divided states such as Ohio, the issue of same-sex marriage
may well have determined the outcome of the presidential election” (Klarman
2005, p. 467).
This is not to indicate that no backlash to the Lawrence decision was
present in 2004. In some respect, the 11 state amendments banning gay marriage
speak for themselves. Public opinion on homosexuals declined after the decision
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for the first time since pollsters began tracking attitudes towards homosexuality.
But this decline is likely not traceable to the Lawrence decision directly but to the
insistence by the media that the ruling constituted a pitch down the slippery
slope towards gay marriage (Scott & Saunders 2006). It illustrates how the
emphasis on one dimension of a story can have a considerable effect on public
opinion. Had the decision been framed in a different manner – say, as an issue of
privacy or smaller government – the subsequent opinion polling results might
have been different.
Given the Lawrence example, it’s easy to get the impression that media
effects are always normatively undesirable. One might think – if the media gets it
so wrong, why should we desire an increase in Court news? It’s because the
Supreme Court’s ability to effect social change requires awareness of its rulings,
especially on the refinement or expansion of new rights. In other words,
awareness in new rights cases is a goal to be striven for in and of itself, as
advocacy groups cannot advance meaningful social change through the Court
without it. In the Lawrence case, media effects worked in opposition to LGBT
rights. But framing can also work to advance normatively desirable policies. And
in any event, media effects are entirely unavoidable, intertwined, as they are,
with how humans think about complex issues. The goal should not be to relegate
the Court to its relatively silent position in our democracy but rather to increase
awareness and try to get it right. The relatively unrestricted access to media
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production provided by social networking sites at least gives rights proponents
better ability to frame their own struggle in a way that might benefit them.
The triad of agenda-setting, priming and framing along with the dearth of
access to information about the Court from other sources creates a culture where
the media are almost totally responsible for nurturing or inhibiting nearly all of
the extra-judicial effects activists hope that SCOTUS decisions on new rights will
provoke. The media decide which cases to discuss, which components of the
issue are most important to publicize (meaning, usually, which aspects of the
case are most controversial, that evoke feelings likely to make viewers tune in)
and which dimensions of the different sides of the matter to emphasize. As long
as the media operate as the custodians for public understanding of the Court,
more coverage can be viewed as an end in itself – one that is likely to increase
public awareness of cases before the bar.

Media Coverage & Increased Awareness

Research on media effects found that frames were most effective when
they were at the forefront of traditional news reports (top news stories and frontpage news) and when they had been repeated over time (Iyengar & Simon 1993;
McCombs & Shaw 1972). A 2009 study analyzed the content of television news
and newspaper stories, then made a comparison to surveys on public knowledge
in a number of different countries. The researchers found a connection between
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the length of time a topic remained in the press and increased knowledge of the
story and its facts. Their analysis suggested “…a clear statistical relationship
between extended press visibility and public knowledge” (Curran, et. al. 2009, p.
17). This demonstrates that frequent exposure to a storyline or an idea makes that
idea more accessible and therefore more prominent in people’s minds.
This “exposure equals accessibility” idea is a basic component of how
people learn. If repeated, media-mediated exposure to information did not make
a person more aware of said information, the entire advertising industry would
be in shambles. However, “unlike a great deal of contemporary
advertising…public affairs news ordinarily lacks the constant repetition which
facilitates learning and familiarity…” (Tichenor, et. al. 1970, p. 162). If one is
getting the bulk of their information about the world from public affairs news
then frequent and focused exposure is required.
“[T]here is evidence that exposure to one story presented a single time
may not necessarily lead to learning of any significance. Important events and
issues often receive extensive coverage over time and across news outlets,
however. This repetition may be central to audience retention of the information.
When the media present the same or similar stories over a period of time, they
are giving the audience a chance to mentally rehearse the information…Such
rehearsal allows individuals to retain the information, even in cases of passive
learning” (Tewksbury et. al. 2001, p. 534).
Frequent exposure engenders availability, fact recall and, subsequently,
awareness. This is how we learn from media. But there are different kinds of
political learning. Neuman (1981) called these differentiation and integration.
Differentiation is basically fact retention while integration refers to the way
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political information is organized in terms of “abstract or ideological constructs”
(Neuman 1981, p. 1237). Graber’s (2001) delineation of political learning is
similar but she distinguishes between connotative and denotative learning.
Denotative information is similar to differentiation in that it is basically factual
knowledge. Connotative knowledge makes connections between new
information and stored information, that information which is incorporated into
a structural belief system.
Although the bulk of political science research – especially that on the
Supreme Court – measures fact retention (Gibson & Caldeira 2009), integrated
information seems an important aspect of political belief and behavior. For
instance, the frequent inability of the surveyed public to remember the names of
the sitting Supreme Court justices may not be as important as whether their
feelings translate into political beliefs about the Court that support the
institution’s legitimacy or political behavior that allows support for social
change. “Scholars who measure political knowledge routinely ignore the
importance of connotative thinking. They prize people’s ability to remember the
facts and denotations, without testing whether they understand the significance
of the information” (Graber 2001, p. 22).
Differentiated or denotative thinking about the Court and its individual
decisions may lag, but the structural significance of the Court is not necessarily
lost on the public. This is evidenced in part by the relatively high and steady
level of approval the Supreme Court enjoys (Baird & Gangl 2006; Caldeira 1986;
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Gibson & Caldeira 2009). While public information about individual cases before
the Court and Court personalities is often low, the Court as an institution seems
to occupy a symbolically meaningful presence in American life. Beliefs about the
Court as an institution are typically inculcated in early education and culture,
producing structural awareness of the Court as symbolically important to our
democracy.
Awareness of individual cases before the Court is poorer because
knowledge about this dimension of the Court is customarily gained through the
media, likely producing a more differentiated aspect of awareness. As Gibson
and Caldeira (2009) suggest, it would be difficult to imagine a situation where
some kind of normatively desirable social policy was inhibited by the public’s
inability to recall – on-the-spot - the names of each sitting Supreme Court justice.
Social policy is, however, inhibited by public ignorance of Supreme Court rulings
on new rights.
Research has shown that while awareness of important Court cases often
rose in the wake of the decision, memory retention of the facts and themes of the
cases in the weeks following were typically minimal (Mondak & Smithey 1997).
It may be that emotional framing of Court cases helps to create more structured
understanding, facilitating the kind of awareness that is more lasting. In Court
cases dealing with new rights, the amount of awareness required to facilitate
social change is likely abetted by frames that emphasize the personal nature of
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the case and its connection to every day life along with frequent and relatively
lasting exposure to the issue.
Successful public awareness campaigns bolster this idea. In
communications literature, public information campaigns or PICs, provide
insight into how framing and exposure work to change public policy.
Government-sponsored PICs are of interest because they seek to obtain a policy
goal (e.g. reduce forest fires, increase condom usage, reduce drunk driving,
increase recycling, etc.) “without altering incentives or public authority systems”,
but simply by increasing awareness through media exposure (Weiss & Tschirhart
1994). Furthermore, since these types of operations have measureable success or
failure (i.e. forest fires are either reduced after the campaign or they are not) they
offer useful insight into what aspects of media exposure increase substantive
awareness of an issue. Unsurprisingly, research on PICs shows that frequent
exposure and framing that increases personal salience are both components of
fruitful PICs (Knight 1999; Holder & Treno 1997; Weiss & Tschirhart 1994). The
authors of one study called creating an emotional connection between one’s
personal behavior and larger societal impacts “triggering norms”(Weiss &
Tschirhart 1994). The respect accorded to the Supreme Court as an institution
may allow their rulings to trigger norms, altering the behavior people exhibit
towards minority communities recognized in Court rulings.
Research also found that establishing middle-range goals was important
for PICs (Mendelsohn 1973). The objectives for what informing the public
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through the media can achieve must be narrowly construed and reasonably
achievable. Applied to the Supreme Court, goals for public awareness must
adhere to this idea. It’s implausible that Court cases on new rights will make a
substantial emotional impact on every member of the public, converting large
majorities to the justices’ way of thinking, nor is something like that necessarily
desirable. It is enough that public awareness of Court decisions be sizable and
fairly accurate among political elites and the public. This is the basic, minimum
requirement for the enforcement of policies concerning social change. More
media exposure and congenial framing should advance this important yet
middle-range goal.

The Internet & Public Awareness: Learning from the Web

Not every person is equally likely to absorb political information from the
media. People’s interest in politics, the type and amount of media they seek out,
education levels, age and political pre-dispositions all impact knowledge-seeking
behavior and knowledge absorption (Tichenor et. al. 1970; Holder & Treno 1997;
Hoekstra 2003; Iyengar et. al. 1982). When the internet began to change how
people accessed media, a great deal of theoretical research focused on how the
overwhelming proliferation of hyper-specific news and entertainment sources
might create more a more ignorant populace. As the web evolved, narrowcasting
(or the ability of users to access only those narrow aspects of politics and culture
	
  

47	
  

that are of interest) was proffered as an explanation for political polarization, a
widening information gap between educated news-seekers and the rest of the
public, and the further entrenchment of political opinions (Parsell 2008; Prior
2005; Sunstein 2001). Discussing the results of Jones’ (2000) work, one researcher
offered a concise description of this apprehension. “[A]s opportunities for
narrowcast media expand through the Internet, people will have a greater ability
to shelter themselves from perspectives different from their own and this is likely
to lead to the polarisation of opinions between various audiences” (Parsell 2008,
p. 45).
Concerns about learning ability, access and narrowcasting amount to the
same thing when it comes to political news – certain people are simply not
interested. Be it due to an intensely focused narrowcasting of news sources,
inability to comprehend the political sphere or plain disinterest, political news
has to contend with a significant amount of apathy and the unwillingness of the
public to pay attention. For this reason it’s been postulated that what matters
most in terms of making gains in public awareness is the number of people that
can be informed “inadvertently” or “incidentally” (Curran & Iyengar et. al. 2009;
Macoby & Markel 1973; Mendehlson 1973; Prior 2005; Schulz 1982; Tewksbury
et. al. 2001). Inadvertent audiences are those who were not intending to seek
information from the media but came across it incidentally.
Studies on traditional media models have shown that public models
(those that require a certain amount of educational and news programming), like
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those in certain parts of Europe, lead to better understanding of news and events
than the market model that exists in the United States (Curran & Iyengar et. al.
2009). The authors of this study are quick to point out that this is not solely a
function of increased exposure to educational news but that, combined with the
public model’s ability to inform the inadvertent viewer.
“Indeed, we suspect that a critical difference between the public service and
market models is the greater ability of the former to engage an ‘inadvertent’
audience: people who might be generally disinclined to follow the course of
public affairs, but who cannot help encountering news while awaiting delivery
of their favourite entertainment programmes. The fact that public service
television intersperses news with entertainment increases the size of the
inadvertent audience” (Curran & Iyengar et. al. 2009, p. 22).
Some scholars have demonstrated that print media is better at expanding
public awareness than television news owing to the fact that printed publications
are able to give more detail and depth than television news programs (Allen &
Izcaray 1988; Boulianne 2011; Culbertson, et. al. 1994; Guo & Moy 1998; McLeod,
et. al. 1999). Online printed news seems to have enhanced this effect, given that
the Web allows readers to come across information that they were not
specifically looking for or which their interests do not necessarily incline them
towards (An et. al., 2011; Boulianne, 2011; de Waal & Shoenbach 2008;
Tewksbury et. al. 2001).
“Audiences can quite easily turn on television, for example, without coming
across news stories. In contrast, many of the most popular sites on the World
Wide Web have integrated quite diverse areas of content on centralized services
and pages. The Web may be unique in its ability to provide a typical user with an
array of information choices that extend far beyond what he or she intentionally
seeks” (Tewksbury et. al. 2001, p. 534).
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This is one reason why social media is such a promising outlet for
information about the Court. Social media, or social networking sites (SNS) allow
users to generate content and share it online with the public or a select group of
friends and family. Before social networking, news on the Internet was presented
in much the same format as that of a newspaper. Now, social media has
normalized “newsfeeds”. Information is presented in a scroll formation and
entertainment and public affairs media is intermingled to a large degree. The
introduction of social networking has therefore likely expanded the modest but
potentially important section of the public who are exposed to news that they
were not pursuing.
Many Americans access these news feeds on their cell phones, which are
internet-connected, and constantly on their person. This perpetual digital access
has apparently increased the number of people who consume news. In 2012, total
traffic to the top 25 news sites increased 7.2%, thanks in large part to the
proliferation of smartphones and tablets (Pew Research Center’s Project for
Excellence in Journalism 2013).
A Pew Research Center poll published in 2013 reported that 73% of the
online public uses social media websites. Facebook and Twitter are two of the
most-used sites with Facebook being far and away the most popular – utilized by
71% of those online in 2013. Twitter was used by about 18% of people the same
year. Facebook and Twitter news feeds have been found to increase inadvertent
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exposure, broadcasting news to those who would not otherwise follow current
events (Pew Research 4 February 2013).
Even though most US adults do not visit Facebook with the intent of
getting news, 78% of users access news there incidentally (Pew Research 4
February 2013). Of those respondents who categorized themselves as “less
engaged” with news and politics, 47% say Facebook is an important source for
news and that they would not be aware of current events were it not for the
inadvertent exposure to news they experienced there (Mitchell et. al. 2013). Half
of Twitter users use the site specifically to access news, amounting to 8% of US
adult users (Holcomb et. al. 2013).
Incidental news exposure online is one way SNS could be expanding the
scope of the information the electorate receives on public affairs. Social
networking is also likely increasing the number of news sources users receive
news from, despite the tendency to narrowcast. “Indirect exposure also increases
the diversity of media sources from which an audience gets its information; we
found that with indirect exposure, users receive information from six to ten times
more media sources than from direct exposure alone” (An et. al 2011, p. 19).
The agenda-setting power of the mainstream press is also likely affected
by social networking. In the study referenced above, the authors tracked Twitter
users who subscribed to news sources representing only one ideological position.
These they coded “left”, “right” and “center”. They found that Twitter increased
exposure to a range of opinions outside of each ideological group’s own
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preferences. Between 60 and 98% of coded users were exposed to differing
political opinions in their news feed (An et. al. 2011). The news feed construct
appears to make it more difficult to narrowcast in the isolating way that some
scholars feared during the advent of the internet.
The most interesting aspect of social media’s potential to affect the
agenda-setting power of mainstream political news is also the least studied.
Namely, it is the complex multi-directional relationship that mainstream news
has developed with social media-generated stories. Before the rise of social
media, Wallsten (2007) wrote of political blogs,
“The emergence and growth of the political blogosphere may force those
interested in policy making to reconceptualize how issues arrive on the political
agenda. Indeed, because political blogs provide easily accessible and frequently
updated information about the attitudes of politically active citizens, journalists
are increasingly relying on them as a shortcut for determining whether an
emerging political issue is worth discussing” (p. 567).
In his subsequent study of the effects of political blogs on mainstream
news, Wallen found that on some topics, the blogs drove coverage of the story to
the mainstream media. On some topics, mainstream media determined the
coverage on political blogs. On still other topics, the topic was sparked by blog
coverage, picked up briefly by mainstream news but then sustained over time by
persistent bloggers.
This exchange of agenda-setting powers has been enhanced greatly by the
real-time nature of social networking sites like Twitter. Journalists cannot ignore
the power of social media users to break huge news stories. In 2011 Newt
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Gingrich’s run for president and the raid on Osama Bin Laden’s lair both broke
on Twitter as did news of the Boston marathon bombing in 2013. News of the
Egyptian uprising broke on Facebook while news of protesters being killed in
Bahrain broke on YouTube. Social networking has become a staple of the news
cycle “…and now plays a role in the way stories are sourced, broken and
distributed” (Newman 2011, p. 6).
Mainstream news is still that, mainstream. The bulk of the public who
access news, inadvertently or intentionally, will get that news from a mainstream
news source. But now, social media users have an opportunity to add to the
agenda, to participate in framing the news by emphasizing certain dimensions of
the topic and to sustain reporting on a subject over time. Until social scientists
research the complex relationship between user-directed media and mainstream
news, we cannot know the extent to which SNS users are able to influence public
learning.
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Chapter II. Media & Public Awareness: The Gay Marriage Cases

The awareness campaign surrounding the Windsor and Perry cases has
been one of the most successful ever accomplished. But the Respect for Marriage
Coalition’s (RMC) campaign was the result of decades of work by various LGBT
rights organizations and a great deal of strategic compromise in the fight for
equality. Most gay rights proponent organizations are all too aware of the
principles of Klarman’s and Rosenberg’s critiques of litigation strategies. How to
avoid moving “too far too fast” ahead of public opinion and evade a backlash
was and is a very real concern for LGBT organizations. Sodomy laws were not
outlawed until 2003 and public opinion in favor of gay marriage has only just
passed the 50% mark – a significant accomplishment but not an overwhelming
vote of confidence. Many gays and lesbians felt dubious about the prospect of
either case to succeed in the ideologically divided Court they were argued before
(Arana 2011). A loss at the Supreme Court level might be catastrophic to future
litigation and some feared that a favorable decision in Perry would provoke a
nation-wide backlash like that that occurred after Lawrence.
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The Campaign(s)

The American Federation for Equal Rights (AFER) began pursuing the
Perry litigation in 2008 when California became the twenty-ninth state to pass a
constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage. AFER (which
organization exclusively uses litigation strategies) was the sole partner in the
courtside fight against Perry and would advance the first case to challenge
opposition to same-sex marriage at the federal level. The federal filing was a
surprise to many advocacy groups whose strategy at the federal level was mostly
incremental (Arana 2009).
Concern over the Perry strategy led nine organizations, including Lambda
Legal, the HRC and the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to author a joint
memo warning that popular backlash might lead to defeat in the Supreme Court.
The memo title could have been a chapter heading in Rosenberg’s book: “Why
the Ballot Box and Not the Courts Should Be the Next Step on Marriage in
California” (Garofoli 2009). While advocacy groups agreed with the goal of
achieving same-sex marriage on a national level, it seems they also believed that
resources were not well spent on a litigation strategy that would push for rights
the American public did not seem ready to give.
AFER’s lawyers were not members of any LGBT advancement
organizations; they had made their name fighting the tobacco industry and Wall
Street. They argued that it was not right to ask their clients to wait five or ten
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years to be recognized by the government as legally married (Garofoli 2009).
Similarly, Edith Windsor, the plaintiff in Windsor was unable to find a gay rights
organization to take her case. She ended up with a private firm who had
previously (and unsuccessfully) challenged the inability of same-sex couples to
marry in New York State in 2006 (Applebome 2012).
Once the Perry case was filed federally, the ALCU and Lambda Legal
reluctantly lent their support to the AFER lawyers, although they were barred
from joining the case. Two years after Perry was filed in federal court, the ACLU
agreed to represent the Windsor plaintiff along with a New York chapter of the
ALCU and Windsor’s law firm, Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP.
In 2011, the Obama administration announced that they would not defend the
constitutionality of DOMA in further challenges to the law. By 2012, when the
Court granted certiorari to both the Windsor and Perry cases, LGBT rights
organizations had decided to throw their collective weight behind the lawsuits
and the Respect for Marriage Coalition (RMC) was formed.
The Human Rights Campaign (HRC) and Freedom to Marry co-chaired
the RMC, a group of 170 activist and legal organizations including the ACLU
and various labor groups. The RMC used the traditional media outlets available
to them and like many activist groups before them placed prominent op-eds in
America’s newspapers, paid for television and print advertisements and enlisted
support from a diverse roster of public figures (including various representatives
from the White House) in the form of amicus briefs. They also staged rallies
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outside of the Supreme Court building on the days oral arguments in the cases
were heard. But the RMC campaign was innovative for what it accomplished
through social media.

Lead Stories, Emotional Framing & Informing the Uninterested

In the weeks before oral arguments began, HRC released a video to social
networking website YouTube which featured former Secretary of State Hilary
Clinton discussing the case for marriage rights and the evolution of her own
opinion on the subject. The video has since been viewed by nearly half a million
people on HRC’s YouTube channel alone and HRC estimates that it was seen by
nearly 24 million people at the time it was released. Because of its online
popularity and the prominence of Mrs. Clinton, the video was featured as a lead
news story on national news broadcasts including NBC, CBS, ABC, MSNBC, Fox
News and local newscasts in 44 states. In the final days before oral arguments in
the Perry case, Republican Senator Rob Portman, from Ohio, and five other
Democratic Senators announced their support for marriage equality and the
RMC created a sharable social media image for each, rating millions of views and
mentions on Facebook and Twitter and a number of stories on local television
newscasts (Human Rights Campaign 2013).
On 25 March 2013, the HRC made a Facebook post, with a shareable
image of their marriage equality symbol and asked supporters to make this their
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profile picture on their favorite social media platforms. This initial post was
shared 71,000 times and “liked” 19,000 times. Each time a post is “liked” or
shared by a Facebook user, that post becomes visible in the newsfeeds of that
user’s friends list. A post is also generated in friends’ and subscribers’ feeds
when a profile picture is changed. This organic sharing approach combined with
the newsfeed structure of social networking allows sharable images like these to
be viewed by an audience that is orders of magnitude larger than traditional
media might have provided.4
According to Facebook Analytics and Data Science, upwards of 2.7 million
people changed their profile pictures immediately after HRC’s request.5,6 While
denounced by many online as “slacktivism” (a portmanteau meaning activism
that is essentially meaningless because of the ease with which people can
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
4 There are a significant number of ways for users to tweak what appears in their
newsfeed. Currently in 2014, according to Facebook Data Science, the average
Facebook user has the potential of seeing 1500 posts in their newsfeed per day
but they will typically only see about 20% of these. Facebook’s algorithms
determines what users will see, placing an emphasis on pictures, videos and
posts that have a large number of “likes” or comments. In 2013, Facebook
introduced an algorithm that would re-post popular stories at the top of a users’
news feed at several points during the day, making it more difficult for users to
miss stories that their friends “liked” or commented on. The image-attached
aspect of HRC’s posts and the high number of likes and re-posts allotted to each
suggests that these are posts likely to have been seen in most users’ newsfeeds.
5 Facebook analytics is not currently able to detect images, so it cannot state
definitively whether the huge increase in profile picture changes made after
HRC’s request were made in response to the request. Their webpage indicated
that 120% more people changed their profile picture the day after HRC’s request
than had changed it the same day one week previously.
6 Of course, many Facebook users’ networks overlap. The median number of
friends each Facebook user has is 200, the average number is 338.
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accomplish it), the profile picture campaign allowed some LGBT members and
supporters to “come out” to their social networks, a meaningful and sometimes
dangerous symbolic action for those in conservative or religious networks of
friends. In an interview conducted in September of 2013, an HRC spokesperson
related one story connected to the ad campaign.
“[Anastasia] Khoo said one of her favorite stories spurred by the HRC campaign
came from a gay soldier from Arkansas. Before the Supreme Court hearings, the
soldier had not spoken to his mother since he came out to her — and ‘it didn't go
so well.’ But when HRC launched the campaign, the soldier's mom changed her
profile picture to the red logo with the following caption: ‘As Justin's mom I may
not like his lifestyle choice, but he knows he has my support in whatever he
does. We may not agree on his choices, but he is still my baby and you don't
mess with one of my cubs. Love you so much Justin and I am proud of who you
are’” (Wagner 2013).
The HRC directors believed that seeing the idea of support for SSM
attached to a person would help give the idea emotional heft (Buchanan 2013).
Thirteen members of Congress changed their profile pictures to the equality
symbol. By 26 March 2013, when oral arguments began, the image had been
viewed more than ten million times around the world. HRC’s posts alone
appeared over 18 million times in users’ news feeds (HRC 2013).
Corporate and celebrity accounts changed their profile photos, exposing
untold millions of followers to the marriage equality symbol and potentially
alerting them to the cases before the Court and their particulars. During oral
arguments, the Budweiser Beer account changed its profile photos on Facebook
and Twitter to the HRC logo, broadcasting the image to its 5.6 million followers.
Dozens of state governors and other state elected officials changed their profile
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pictures to HRC’s logo within 72 hours of the campaign’s request. The social
media frenzy fed into the mainstream press. Television and print media picked
up the story of the spread of the red HRC logo, further publicizing the campaign.
The millions of impressions made by RMC’s social media campaign
translated into measurable information-seeking action by some of the public. On
the first day of the profile picture campaign (25 March 2013), traffic to the HRC
website increased 600% (Wagner 2013). On 26 March 2013, the day oral
arguments began, HRC’s website received 700,000 unique visitors. The site
directed people to information about the Supreme Court cases, the issues
surrounding them and the cases’ potential outcomes. In the first two days of the
profile picture campaign, 100,000 new people signed RMC’s petition pledging
support for same-sex marriage.
The RMC worked hard to frame the LGBT struggle as that of the average
person rather than that of a specialized interest group. They were working to
win, as they called it, “hearts and minds” (Brillhart 2014). HRC and Freedom to
Marry emphasized personal stories on their website and in their posts to social
media. These were stories of families barred from seeing their loved ones in
hospital, couples who had been together decades and had never been able to
marry and families torn apart by custody arrangements that were biased. The
amicus brief submitted by Lambda Legal and the Gay and Lesbian Advocates
and Defenders (GLAD) focused significant portions of its text not on legal
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arguments but on stories of the personal injuries suffered by gay families that
had been discriminated against.
The RMC campaign accomplished the goals of successful PICs and laid
the foundation for increasing public awareness. The complex relationship
between new media and traditional media allowed the campaign to be featured
as a lead story on television, in newspapers and web news – a crucial component
of successful agenda-setting. That the campaign began in March during oral
arguments and did not end until the Court handed down its decision in June
allowed lengthy exposure, sustained over time by social media. The emotional
framing that the profile picture campaign provided, connecting personal profiles
to symbols that pledged support, is a feat that could only have been
accomplished through social media. Further framing was carefully devised to
emphasize the emotional dimension of the same-sex marriage issue rather than
the legal aspects. Most importantly, the elaborate web of social media
connections and newsfeeds pushed information outwards, far beyond the
audience traditional media might have informed.

A different decision made the same term that Perry and Windsor were
decided throws the social activity surrounding the gay marriage cases into
sharper relief. Shelby County v. Holder (2013) was handed down one day prior to
Windsor and Perry. In it, the Court made another landmark ruling, striking down
important provisions of the 1965 Voting Rights Act (VRA). The VRA was enacted
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to prevent states from instituting a “test or device” to systematically prevent
minorities from voting or having their votes counted. These voting restrictions
were a part of what were commonly known as Jim Crow laws. Section Five of the
VRA required covered areas to obtain approval from the federal government for
any changes to their voting requirement laws. Striking down this section of the
law effectively gutted the legislation, kicking the responsibility for equitable
treatment of minorities at the polls back to state legislators who would now lack
the oversight that the VRA had provided.
The fight against the overturn of Section Five was aided by social
organization. On 27 February 2013, when oral arguments were heard in the case,
the NAACP – who were also responsible for litigating the case - staged a rally on
the steps of the Court, just as organizers would for the Windsor and Perry
arguments. The NAACP also joined with digital public relations group Fission to
create a shareable infographic illustrating the importance of Section Five. Before
oral arguments, in an online conference, NAACP’s Jotaka Eaddy asked
supporters to publicize the hashtag7 “#protectVRA” (Walker 2013). The
Advancement Project joined with the NAACP and 8 other social justice
organizations for a Twitter Townhall meeting intended to help educate people
about Section Five and the threat to voting rights.

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
7 A hashtag is a word or phrase followed by the “#” sign. The “#” sign acts to
categorize the phrase for metadata purposes. It also allows the topic to be
grouped so that the topics they denote are more easily accessible.
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In the mainstream press, coverage of the VRA decision fared well. Most
major newspapers reported the decision on their front page, just as they did one
day later with the gay marriage decisions. But the civil rights stalwarts,
undeniably skilled at grassroots organizing, did not or could not, compete with
RMC in the realm of social media. The RMC simply had more of everything.
They had more followers on Twitter (HRC and Freedom to Marry have a
combined 406,000 followers compared to the NAACP’s 68, 0008. Even adding
member organization ACLU’s followers to the NAACP’s total only increases the
number to 268,000, still half of the number of RMC-founding organization’s
followers). The RMC had more mainstream media coverage generated by their
social media campaign (I was unable to find any mainstream news stories
regarding the social media campaign surrounding the Shelby Co. case, although
there were several stories on social media users’ response to the ruling). There
were mainstream press announcements when HRC pledged one million dollars
to the awareness campaign, local mainstream press announcements when state
legislators or governors changed their profile photos or posted to social media in
support of gay marriage. Subsequent awards for the RMC’s social media

	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
8 These numbers are publically available on Twitter and they are reported as of
June 2014. Fisson, who paired with the NAACP for their online campaign
reportedly quadrupled (according to the “campaigns” page on their website) the
number of followers the organization had in the days leading up the Shelby Co.
decision. So the number of followers the NAACP had on Twitter during oral
arguments in their case were likely much lower.	
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campaign received coverage in the mainstream news as well.9 In the twelve
hours after the Windsor decision became public, the hashtag “#VRA” was
tweeted 948 times. This compared to the 33, 988 mentions of the hashtag
“#DOMA” on the same site.10
The RMC had more public figures speaking out in support of their cases
and more organizations in their coalition (According to press releases from the
respective organizations, the RMC had 170 member organizations including the
NAACP. In contrast, the NAACP had only a handful of supporting
organizations listed on their website as members of their VRA campaign. Of
these, only the ACLU has a significant web presence). Each of RMC’s member
associations created their own social media posts, pushing their message farther
each time. The RMC’s profile photo campaign alone generated a huge amount of
mainstream media attention, an aspect of the publicity cycle that the NAACP did
not attempt. Which is all to say that if sustained exposure and reaching an
inadvertent audience creates awareness then public knowledge with regard to
the gay marriage cases would be expected to exceed, by far, that of the VRA case
– or any other Court case from that term.
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  
9 According to HRC’s website, they won nine awards for their online campaign
including a Mashie for Best Social Media Campaign of the Year.
10 The total number of tweets during RMC’s social media campaign were
published by a number of marketing agencies that collected information on the
success of their campaign. The number of times “#VRA” and “#DOMA” were
tweeted was recorded by two marketing companies: Meltwater Social Analytics
and Lexalytics (which markets lexical analysis software). Twitter does not allow
access to historical data except through third-party providers, so I was unable to
complete my own analysis of tweets regarding SSM or the VRA.	
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The Results

Polls taken when the decision was handed down confirmed that
awareness of Perry and Windsor was, relatively, quite high. “Two-thirds (66%)
know that the court ruled in favor of same-sex marriage supporters, while about
the same share (67%) knows that it is up to individual states to determine
whether gay couples can get married” (Pew Research 1 July 2013). To recognize
that the Perry decision allowed individual states to retain the right to decide
issues of SSM shows a substantive understanding of the ruling. Awareness
surrounding the decision in Shelby Co. again puts this relative awareness into
context. Knowledge about the VRA decision was much more in keeping with
political scientists’ typically gloomy view of public cognizance. According to
polls,
“Just 34% know that the court overturned parts of the Voting Rights Act; 23% say
incorrectly it kept the law intact and 43% have no opinion. Opinions about the
court’s decision in the case also reflect some confusion: A plurality (43%) has no
opinion on the ruling, while 33% approve and 25% disapprove” (Pew Research
Center 1 July 2013).
Remarkably, polling found that interest in the cases, before either decision
was published, was nearly the same. About one-third (33%) of Americans
expressed an interest in the outcome of Shelby Co. while the same number
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expressed an interest in the outcomes of Windsor and Perry (Pew Research 24
June 2013). In keeping with the pre-decision polling on case interest, gaymarriage was the largest news story of the week, with 30% of Americans
reporting that they watched the story “closely”. In contrast to that polling, only
19% reported that they followed the VRA case closely (Pew Research 1 July
2013).
Until the 2013 term, the most closely watched case – according to polls –
was the ruling on the Affordable Care Act. Forty-five percent of Americans
reported that they would watch that case closely. However, even given the large
interest before the case, polling after the decision showed that only 55% of
Americans could accurately describe the outcome of the case, 45% stated
incorrectly that nearly all of the provisions of the act had been stricken (Pew
Research 1 July 2012). As for another recent landmark case, only 54% said that
they had heard of Citizens United. Of these, only 18% had watched coverage of the
case or knew more than the name (Pew Research 17 January 2012).
Polling conducted after the decisions were handed down underscores the
benefits of informing the inadvertent audience. Shelby Co. had a strong
correlation between those that stated an interest in the outcome of the case and
the number of people who eventually were able to correctly answer questions
about the ruling. Thirty-three percent of Americans expressed interest in the case
and 34% of Americans were subsequently aware of the outcome. It does not
appear that any disinterested Americans were made aware of the ruling. In
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contrast, the 33% of Americans who stated interest in the SSM cases one day
before the rulings were joined by a significant number of self-reportedly
disinterested Americans the following day when fully 65% could answer
substantive questions about the decisions.
Figure 1: Relative Interest, VRA vs. DOMA
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Young people aged 18 to 29 were more likely than those 65 and older to
know that the Windsor and Perry decisions favored same-sex marriage
proponents - 75% versus 57% (Pew Research 1 July 2013). Interestingly, this
more-informed age demographic makes up the largest population of Twitter
users. “Close to half, 45%, of Twitter news consumers are 18-29 years old. That is
more than twice that of the population overall (21%)…	
  Further, just 2% of
Twitter news consumers are 65 or older, compared with 18% of the total
population” (Mitchell 2013).
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This is, of course, only an intriguing correlation. That young people were
more aware of the SSM rulings and are also more likely to use social media is
compelling but could also be explained by other factors. Pew did not find any
partisan difference in awareness of Windsor and Perry. Democrats were as likely
as Republicans to know about the rulings. But the young are, overall, more
supportive of gay rights (Pew Research 10 March 2014). It may be that the SSM
cases were simply more salient with a younger population that is also more
connected. Perhaps, for whatever reason, people simply care more about gay
marriage than about racial politics in the South or campaign contributions or
health care. If this is the case, the personal framing of the SSM issue by the RMC
may still have contributed, helping to create an emotional storyline that appealed
to a normally disinterested public.
Based on the limited information available, it appears that the RMC’s
awareness campaign was very effective. It resulted in substantive awareness and
a number of measurable indicators of the extra-judicial benefits Dynamic Court
theorists look for. There are indications that the SCOTUS decisions and the
RMC’s awareness campaign increased salience, appropriated elite influence,
positively effected public opinion and caused a movement to cohere.
Rosenberg asked that when researchers look for salience they should be
able to measure not only an increase in reporting on an issue but also increased
positive attention to the issue. The week of the rulings, gay marriage was the most
reported and most followed news story (Pew Research 1 July 2013). The year of
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the Court decisions, mainstream media news stories that were favorable to SSM
advocates predominated five to one over negatively framed stories (Desilver
2013). According to Lexalytics’ sentiment analysis conducted on the day of the
SSM rulings, of 179, 884 tweets on the subject of gay marriage, positive sentiment
tweets were counted two to one over negatively worded tweets.
Rosenberg also warned that we could not attribute lawmaking action to
elite influence provided by Supreme Court leadership without evidence of
attribution. Unlike the 11 state bans on SSM that passed after the Lawrence ruling,
19 states including Texas, Utah, Delaware, Kentucky and Michigan have adopted
same-sex marriage either through their courts or through their legislatures since
the June 2013 decisions. Many judges and lawmakers have attributed their
decisions to the Windsor and Perry rulings (Botellho 2014). In the 20 cases dealing
with SSM brought before a court since June of 2013, all 20 have been decided in
favor of the LGBT plaintiffs (Freedom to Marry n.d.). The United States Census
Bureau announced this year that, for the first time, it would begin counting
same-sex couples with a marriage certificate as married partners rather than as
cohabiting partners (Cohn 2014).
Public opinion remains divided on same-sex marriage, but support for
SSM reached its highest peak in history after the Supreme Court decisions were
announced. Fifty-three percent said that they approved of allowing gays and
lesbians to marry while only 41% disapproved (Pew Research 10 March 2014). In
religious communities, where opposition to same-sex marriage has been
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strongest, opinion appears to have changed a great deal since SCOTUS’s
decisions. For instance, among black Protestants, support for SSM grew from
32% in 2013 to 43% in 2014. Only white Evangelicals’ opinions did not change
after the ruling, remaining flat (Lipka & Sciupac 2014). This offers some support
for the legitimation theory of Supreme Court influence on public opinion.
The coherence caused by the cases was literal in some ways, bringing 170
disparate organizations together under the RMC. Further coherence was
sparked, not by the Court decision, but certainly by the Court’s granting of
certiorari to the Windsor and Perry plaintiffs. Most LGBT advocacy groups were
content to work slowly through state legislatures, only fully accepting a fight at
the federal court level once the Court had agreed to hear the SSM cases. The fight
for marriage equality has now become one of the defining goals for the LGBT
movement; they were working to overturn sodomy laws only a decade ago.
While these findings are far from definitive, all objective indicia point
towards a positive impact of the gay marriage rulings, the absence of a backlash
and the importance of social media in creating awareness. The cases appear to
support the Dynamic Court assertion that Supreme Court rulings can increase
the salience of an issue to the American public, influence elites, cause movements
to cohere and positively influence public opinion given enough public
awareness.
These results also beg a question: If the RMC’s campaign with regard to
increasing the attention paid to gay rights was so successful, why involve the
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Court at all? Can’t advocacy organizations simply organize these campaigns in
order to change public opinion and succeed at the legislative level? This question
is more complicated than it first appears. In some ways it is simply too early to
know if social media campaigns, organized and implemented properly, can
create social change independent of the courts. If it were possible, it could
represent a polar shift in the democratic process, indicating that well organized
groups could essentially avoid or conquer the disenfranchisement that has
plagued minority groups since the establishment of the country. For this reason,
it seems unlikely. Politicians will still require (or at the very least, desire) political
cover in order to legislate in favor of an unpopular minority and the legislative
branch will in all probability remain difficult to access for these same minorities.
It is more likely that the Court will continue to work in tandem with the
media, however that media is formatted. If said media is more effective at
increasing awareness of new rights decisions, as social media seems to be, all the
better. Court decisions create precedent, which even beyond its direct effect
creates an enormous amount of symbolic utility. Even narrowly construed
decisions, which Perry (simply a refusal to review a lower court judge’s decision)
and Windsor (the striking of one section from a federal statute) arguably were,
can have large legal repercussions given the right circumstances. Though the
Court did not legalize gay marriage in any official sense, the cascade of states
granting the right since the decision came down demonstrates the importance of
the symbolic aspects of precedent in the realm of civil rights.
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Court decisions also provide a focal point for a civil rights campaign.
They provide a timeline, a narrative structure or frame and an outcome - a
measurable loss or achievement. Most importantly, the Court provides
legitimacy to a minority group by virtue of its grant of certiorari. None of these
symbolic gains could be achieved by media influence alone. The Court is
uniquely situated to provide a type of authority not easily achieved through the
legislative branch, nor even the executive.
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Chapter III. Conclusions & Future Study

Awareness of Supreme Court decisions is, ultimately, a public good. It can
allow oppressed minorities access to new rights. It can allow the Court to create
social change. Even for those inclined to distrust the Court’s place in our
democracy, awareness is a benefit as it helps create a more able electorate and
brings Court-made policy out from behind closed doors. This holds true when
the Court makes rulings that we do not agree are normatively desirable.
Awareness is especially essential to the litigation strategy pursued by a number
of advocacy groups in their struggle for equal rights.
The media have been, for better or worse, the primary instrument through
which the public access information on the Court. Their record of educating the
public on this important aspect of public affairs has traditionally been fairly
dismal. The disinterest of the public combines with the market forces our
traditional media operate under to create a sort of void where information about
the Court might exist. Even given all of the powerful cognitive tools the media
have at their disposal – agenda-setting, priming, framing – we have a public that
is renowned for their ignorance of the country’s high Court and, more
troublingly, even its most groundbreaking decisions.
Flawed methodology is responsible for a portion of this renown. Research
on the public’s awareness of the Court has been obsessed with differentiated
learning, or the public’s ability to recall facts about the Court. Who is the Chief
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Justice? Who are the sitting judges? Polling agencies seem to expect a certain
obliviousness from the public on these subjects - after all, what could be the
reason for following questions on the names of the sitting Court justices with
questions about the names of the Seven Dwarves or Judge Wapner except to
create a humorous juxtaposition? Many social scientists seem eager to reference
these polls as conclusive evidence that the public simply lacks the inclination or
intelligence to attend to the judicial branch and its functions. However, the
public’s ability to rattle off the names of the Supreme Court justices or facts about
their tenure seems less important from a policy-implementation perspective than
more substantive information about specific cases before the Court, especially
those dealing with new rights. The measurement of public awareness should be
focused more narrowly on familiarity with specific cases than with simple recall
of legal procedures or sitting justices. Given enough access to information, the
public has the ability to learn, the response to the same-sex marriage cases make
this evident.
However, while the distinction between factual recall and substantive
awareness is an important one for social scientists to make, available evidence
shows that in most cases, both are deficient. Without substantive public
awareness, the Court’s decisions – regardless of their legal impact – can have
little power in terms of public policy and culture. Developing integrated learning
about Court cases in a public that seems largely disinterested in the particulars of
the judicial system is a challenge. Yet, advocates that pursue litigation strategies
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and those concerned with social change through the judicial branch must involve
themselves with public awareness. Without it, the effects of their legal strategies
will be diminished.
The traditional media environment has made the development of public
awareness a formidable task. That this difficulty exists lends a lot of credence to
Rosenberg and Klarman’s claims – whatever else their methodological
weaknesses may be. Klarman and Rosenberg, both legal scholars themselves,
suggest bypassing the Court altogether – at least for minorities attempting to
gain new rights. They advise a more incremental approach through the
legislature, offering that where a litigation strategy has been pursued in order to
gain new rights, the disadvantages are apparent while the advantages are more
esoteric, harder to measure or wholly non-existent.
The most obvious problem with advising advocates to avoid litigation is
this: for many minority groups, working through the legislature is simply not
possible. For the disenfranchised, the courts offer comparatively easy access and
therefore afford, in many cases, the best chance for their group to create social
change. A win at the Court level not only changes the law but combined with
public awareness, it can in fact generate a number of social effects: salience, elite
influence, positive changes in public opinion and movement coherence. The
steady indifference of the public to issues in front of the Court combined with the
media’s episodic and lackadaisical coverage of same has hampered advocates’
ability to nourish social change.
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Before the advent of social media, traditional mainstream media
controlled the framing of minority issues and had the power to either place their
issue on or dislodge it from the national public agenda. Research on how the
public learns from the media finds that frequent and focused exposure to a news
story helps people to access the information from that story more readily. This
means that even if, in the past, traditional media have paid a certain amount of
attention to Court issues – public education on those issues was likely
inadequate if the stories were not lead stories, repeated and emphasized over
time. Emotional framing has also been shown to help people integrate their
feelings about the story into their belief systems, aiding learning rather than
simply fact retention.
Long-term, frequent exposure and emotional framing have been used
efficaciously by public information campaigns (PICs) to achieve policy goals
through public learning. Social media allows advocacy groups to treat their
issues before the Court more like a PIC. The RMC’s campaign surrounding the
gay marriage cases used the tactics of a PIC, aided by freely accessible social
media platforms. The RMC focused on personal stories, families kept apart
because of unjust laws. The group began their campaign when the Court granted
certiorari and continued it until the ruling was handed down many months later,
ensuring frequent and focused exposure to their efforts. Social media also
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abetted another important aspect of any effort to educate the public: engaging
the disinterested audience.
The evidence available makes it seem as though educating the
disinterested as to the cases before the Court in the past constituted a nearly
impossible task. There is a finite amount of space in one’s local newspaper and a
finite amount of time on one’s local newscast. And even given a perfect world
where print and television news paid an appropriate amount of attention to the
Court, if one weren’t interested they could quite easily avoid ever even hearing
of a case. Only a personal conversation with an interested party or inadvertent
exposure to some kind of protest or event in the physical world would expose a
reluctant person to the issue.
The purpose of this work, in part, was to demonstrate that the newsfeed
structure and democratic access of social media exposes a much larger number of
disinterested people to news that they would not otherwise access. It affords
advocacy groups a chance to frame their story and have it seen widely and for a
significantly longer period of time than the average news item would be
accorded in traditional media formats. Social media’s ability to inform the
uninterested is the best explanation for the discontinuity between the public’s
stated interest in the outcomes of Windsor and Perry and the larger than average
level of awareness achieved after the rulings were handed down.

	
  

77	
  

There are a number of impediments to developing a solid theory about
how social media impacts the public-Court relationship. In the research I
conducted, I could find only one organization that consistently measured public
awareness of Supreme Court rulings. Significant polling exists on public opinion
towards controversial issues before the Court and the aftereffect of decisions on
support for the Court. Unless better research is conducted on public awareness of
individual cases – especially those granting new rights – it is impossible to isolate
the impact of awareness campaigns like the RMC’s and subsequently difficult to
assess the ability of the Supreme Court to effect social change in this new media
environment. Awareness is such an important part of an advocacy groups’
ability to benefit from the social change they are litigating for. Consequently, it is
disconcerting to see such limited and inadequate data collection on public
awareness of Court decisions.
Because it is difficult to process cause and effect due to a lack of data, the
attribution of progress in LGBT rights to the Court’s decisions combined with the
RMC’s awareness campaign is more difficult than it might be otherwise. One
might argue that the relative advantage that the gay marriage cases maintained
with regard to public awareness and understanding may have been the result,
not of Court action, but of what Klarman and Rosenberg would call “culture”.
Klarman and Rosenberg both employed the perplexing argument that gay
marriage was inevitable but that courts would or could not be responsible for
making this so, that instead, cultural changes would lead to more favorable laws
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passed through the legislature. Rosenberg (2008) wrote that public opinion had
been trending towards acceptance of homosexuals but this was, “…not primarily
the result of litigation. Rather, [it is] the result of a changing culture" (p. 415).
Klarman noted that, on the whole, American tolerance for gays and lesbians was
quite high and had been getting better at a relatively quick pace. “The shift in
public opinion on this issue within just a few years has been truly astonishing
and it may suggest that the growing power and pervasiveness of popular culture
is likely to cause public attitudes on sexual orientation to shift faster than racial
and gender attitudes changed in preceding generations” (Klarman 2005, pg. 484).
Klarman cited television programs like Will and Grace as a part of the pop-culture
trend making gay rights more likely.
It’s hard to credit the idea that new rights accorded to an oppressed
minority are ever inevitable. But, more unpersuasive is the idea that law and
culture are separate entities that exist apart and do not influence one another in a
meaningful way. It is more likely that law and culture influence one another in
an endless and iterative process that changes over time. Opinion on gay marriage
has, in fact, shifted. If it is true that the Court follows the election returns, as the
saying goes, the litigation strategy is no less important. Keck (2009) emphasized
this point in his critique of Rosenberg and Klarman’s culture/inevitability
argument. He wrote, “Rosenberg and Klarman are right that courts usually will
not act until some progress has been made in the culture at large, but…they may
still act before any other lawmaking institution is willing to do so” (p. 182).
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Which is to say that even if the simple changing of the cultural tide is responsible
for some of the effects attributed to the Court decisions, separating the law from
the culture is a faulty enterprise. Culture cannot move forward without the
progress of law just as law cannot change without the progress of culture.
Despite strong evidence that Brown was not the watershed moment that
Americans learned it was in elementary school, it is unlikely that litigation was
ever the useless, resource-destroying and counterproductive strategy that
Rosenberg and Klarman have maintained it is – at least not in the long-term. But
even granting their view of this strategy – accepting their best evidence and
dismissing relevant critiques – a reassessment of the litigation strategy is still
due, if only because the media environment has changed so much. Despite
limited data, I found evidence that the SSM cases produced extra-judicial effects.
I also measured those effects in precisely the ways advised by Rosenberg. I found
that salience existed in the SSM case by showing that positive news stories about
the case increased. I found elite influence existed in the attribution of judges and
legislators from 19 different states who created SSM law after the Windsor and
Perry decisions came down. I found that public opinion remained steady or
improved with regard to SSM after the decisions, depending on one’s
demographic. No backlash could be measured by public opinion towards the
LGBT community. Lastly, coherence was easily demonstrable in the RMC itself,
composed as it was, by 170 disparate political organizations united in one
purpose. The evidence available lends credence to the idea that the public-Court
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relationship can be made better and that public awareness of Court cases is
possible given the proper efforts and conditions.
The RMC’s large cohort of member organizations allowed their social
media posts to be pushed quickly far and wide – to go viral - into the newsfeeds
of the unaware and disinterested. The RMC benefited doubly with their viral
campaign when the mainstream media picked up the story of the online
movement, broadcasting it further still. In contrast, the NAACP had a much
smaller number of cooperating organizations, none of which have a large online
presence. Though they did contract with an online marketing company to create
a shareable image, the online effort did not appear to be the cornerstone of their
operation, which tended more towards traditional means of publicity like rallies
and traditional media interviews.
The RMC honed in on emotional frames, enlisting people like Hilary
Clinton to discuss her change of heart with regard to SSM and then posting that
video to YouTube. Part of this emotional framing was meant to make people feel
that their own personal opinions and actions were important to the movement.
People felt that they could help not only by signing online petitions but also by
simply changing their profile pictures and alerting their communities of their
support for SSM. According to Mendelsohn (1970), a belief that one’s own
personal efforts matter to a cause is crucial in creating the learning and
awareness that PICs use to succeed. If this is true, it explains a small portion of
why the RMC’s campaign was successful where the movement behind Shelby Co.
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was not. Emotional framing seemed to make people feel that they could help
make gay marriage happen, even if it was by expressing their own opinion on
the matter to their friends. Though the NAACP discussed emotionally-framed
stories of the importance of Section Five to the progress of black Americans, it is
easy to feel that one’s own personal efforts cannot help resolve the seemingly
intractable problem of racial tensions in the South. Perhaps the idea of same-sex
marriage was also, cognitively, a more straightforward concept to envision than
the more troublesome and inscrutable topic of voting rights. Likely, all of these
conditions play some part in explaining why the RMC’s campaign was more
successful than that of the NAACP’s. But, put simply, less frequent and visible
online support correlated with less awareness of Shelby Co. and vice versa with
regard to Windsor and Perry.

Future research opportunities are plentiful. Personal interviews and
survey research done with the public would shed light on precisely where they
are getting their information about the Court. The next Court case to define new
rights may help establish whether the SSM cases were truly an outlier or whether
a public information-oriented campaign can help bring about the extra-judicial
effects needed to undergird social change. It is worth noting that social media is
still relatively new and as it becomes more entrenched in the media landscape
new restrictions, for instance algorithms that favor certain content in a
disadvantageous way, or paywalls that make content more expensive to
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produce, may present themselves. Facebook has already begun limiting content
publishing to public newsfeeds unless the owners of group pages pay a fee. So its
possible that social media campaigns will become more resource intensive than
they are currently.
Even given this imaginable trend, social media is a relatively more
democratic medium than the mainstream press. Our traditional media has been
the custodian of public awareness for so long that a new, more accessible and
incredibly popular vector like SNS has the potential to change the Court-public
relationship in ways we cannot yet anticipate. A reassessment of this
interconnection may thoroughly alter the costs and benefits advocacy groups
perceive when they assess litigation strategies. It may also re-shape some of the
assumptions at the core of Court-public study. That the public cannot be made
aware of the Court due to overwhelming disinterest, that new rights should not
be granted through the Court for fear of backlash, that the Court is unable to
produce social change – all of these suppositions may need to be refined in the
wake of the mass adoption of new media.

	
  

83	
  

References

Allen, R. L., & Izcaray, F. (1988). Nominal Agenda Diversity in a Media-Rich,
Less-Developed Society. Communication Research, 15(1), 29–50.
doi:10.1177/009365088015001002
An, J., Cha, M., Gummadi, P. K., & Crowcroft, J. (2011). Media Landscape in
Twitter: A World of New Conventions and Political Diversity. ICWSM.
Retrieved from
http://www.aaai.org/ocs/index.php/ICWSM/ICWSM11/paper/viewPD
FInterstitial/2825/3283
Arana, Gabriel. (20 January 2011). Redefining Marriage. The American Prospect.
Retrieved from http://prospect.org/article/redefining-marriage-0
Applebome, P. (2012, December 10). Edith Windsor Revels in Gay Marriage Case
Before Supreme Court. The New York Times. Retrieved from
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/11/nyregion/edith-windsor-gaywidow-revels-in-supreme-court-fight.html
Baird, V. A., & Gangl, A. (2006). Shattering the Myth of Legality: The Impact of
the Media’s Framing of Supreme Court Procedures on Perceptions of
Fairness. Political Psychology, 27(4), 597–614.
Behr, R. L., & Iyengar, S. (1985). Television News, Real-World Cues, and Changes
in the Public Agenda. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 49(1), 38–57.
Botellho, Greg. (22 March 2014). State-by-state: A Frenzied Few Months on the SameSex Marriage Front. ( CNN. Retrieved June 24, 2014, from
http://www.cnn.com/2014/05/21/justice/same-sex-marriage-statebreakdown/index.html
Boulianne, S. (2011). Stimulating or Reinforcing Political Interest: Using Panel
Data to Examine Reciprocal Effects Between News Media and Political
Interest. Political Communication, 28(2), 147–162.
doi:10.1080/10584609.2010.540305
Brillhart, E. (2014). A Hope That’s Not So Hollow: How the Supreme Court’s
Decisions in Windsor and Perry Alter the Political Environment in Which
Marriage Equality Activism Operates. Retrieved from
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/scripps_theses/389/
	
  

84	
  

Buchanan, M. (27 March 2013). Painting the Internet Pink. The New Yorker Blogs.
Retrieved from
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/newsdesk/2013/03/paintingthe-internet-pink.html
Caldeira, G. A. (1986). Neither the Purse Nor the Sword: Dynamics of Public
Confidence in the Supreme Court. The American Political Science Review,
80(4), 1209–1226. doi:10.2307/1960864
Cappella, J. N., & Jamieson, K. H. (1996). News Frames, Political Cynicism, and
Media Cynicism. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social
Science, 546, 71–84.
Casey, G. (1974). The Supreme Court and Myth: An Empirical Investigation. Law
& Society Review, 8(3), 385–419. doi:10.2307/3053081
Chong, D., & Druckman, J. N. (2007). Framing Theory. Annual Review of Political
Science, 10(1), 103–126. doi:10.1146/annurev.polisci.10.072805.103054
Clawson, R. A., Strine, H. C. “Neil”, & Waltenburg, E. N. (2003). Framing
Supreme Court Decisions The Mainstream Versus the Black Press. Journal of
Black Studies, 33(6), 784–800. doi:10.1177/0021934703033006004
Cohn, D. (29 May 2014). Census Says It Will Count Same-Sex Marriages, But
With Caveats. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/05/29/census-says-it-willcount-same-sex-marriages-but-with-caveats/
Coleman, C., Nee, L. D., & Rubinowitz, L. S. (2005). Social Movements and
Social-Change Litigation: Synergy in the Montgomery Bus Protest. Law &
Social Inquiry, 30(4), 663–736.
Culbertson, E., Evarts, D., Richard, P. B., Sandell, K., & Stempel, H. (1994). Media
Use, Attention to Media and Agenda Richness. Newspaper Research
Journal, 15(1), 14.
Curran, J., Iyengar, S., Lund, A. B., & Salovaara-Moring, I. (2009). Media System,
Public Knowledge and Democracy A Comparative Study. European Journal
of Communication, 24(1), 5–26. doi:10.1177/0267323108098943
Davis, R., & Davis, R. (1994). Decisions and Images: The Supreme Court and the Press.
Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
	
  

85	
  

Desilver. D. (21 June 2013). Ahead of Same-Sex Marriage Decisions, What You
Need to Know. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/06/21/ahead-of-same-sexmarriage-decisions-what-you-need-to-know/
De Waal, E., & Schoenbach, K. (2008). Presentation Style and Beyond: How Print
Newspapers and Online News Expand Awareness of Public Affairs Issues.
Mass Communication and Society, 11(2), 161–176.
doi:10.1080/15205430701668113
Druckman, J. N. (2001). The Implications of Framing Effects for Citizen
Competence. Political Behavior, 23(3), 225–256. doi:10.1023/A:1015006907312
Druckman, J. N., & Holmes, J. W. (2004). Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter?
Priming and Presidential Approval. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 34(4), 755–
778.
Duggan, M., & Smith, A. (30 December 2013). Social Media Update 2013. Pew
Research Center’s Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved from
http://www.pewinternet.org/2013/12/30/social-media-update-2013/
Epstein, L., & Segal, J. A. (2000). Measuring Issue Salience. American Journal of
Political Science, 44(1), 66–83. doi:10.2307/2669293
Farganis, D. (2012). Do Reasons Matter? The Impact of Opinion Content on
Supreme Court Legitimacy. Political Research Quarterly, 65(1), 206–216.
Franklin, C. H., & Kosaki, L. C. (1989). Republican Schoolmaster: The U.S.
Supreme Court, Public Opinion, and Abortion. The American Political Science
Review, 83(3), 751–771. doi:10.2307/1962059
Franklin, C. H., Kosaki, L. C., & Kritzer, H. M. (1993). The Salience of US
Supreme Court Decisions. In Paper delivered at the annual meeting of the
American Political Science Association, Washington, DC. Retrieved from
http://users.polisci.wisc.edu/kritzer/research/opinion/apsa1993.pdf
Freedom to Marry. (n.d.) Marriage Litigation. Retrieved June 24, 2014, from
http://www.freedomtomarry.org/litigation
Gamson, W. A., & Modigliani, A. (1989). Media Discourse and Public Opinion on
Nuclear Power: A Constructionist Approach. American Journal of Sociology,
95(1), 1–37.
	
  

86	
  

Garofoli, J., Chronicle Staff. (2009, May 28). Gay Rights Advocates Rip Suit to Undo
Prop. 8. SFGate. Retrieved June 24, 2014, from
http://www.sfgate.com/politics/article/Gay-rights-advocates-rip-suit-toundo-Prop-8-3297000.php#src=fb
Garrow, D. J. (1994). Hopelessly Hollow History: Revisionist Devaluing of Brown
v. Board of Education. Virginia Law Review, 80(1), 151–160.
doi:10.2307/1073593
Ghanem, S. (1997). Filling in the Tapestry: The Second Level of Agenda Setting.
Communication and Democracy: Exploring the Intellectual Frontiers in AgendaSetting Theory, 3-14.
Gibson, J. L., & Caldeira, G. A. (2009). Knowing the Supreme Court? A
Reconsideration of Public Ignorance of the High Court. The Journal of
Politics, 71(02), 429–441. doi:10.1017/S0022381609090379
Graber, D. A. (2009). Mass Media and American Politics. New York. Sage
Publishing.
Grosskopf, A., & Mondak, J. J. (1998). Do Attitudes Toward Specific Supreme
Court Decisions Matter? The Impact of Webster and Texas v. Johnson on
Public Confidence in the Supreme Court. Political Research Quarterly, 51(3),
633–654. doi:10.2307/3088042
Guo, Z., & Moy, P. (1998). Medium or Message? Predicting Dimensions of
Political Sophistication. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 10(1),
25–50. doi:10.1093/ijpor/10.1.25
Haider-Markel, D. P. (2006). Understanding Variations in Media Coverage of
U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: Comparing Media Outlets in Their Coverage
of Lawrence v. Texas. The Harvard International Journal of Press/Politics, 11(2),
64–85. doi:10.1177/1081180X05286065
Hall, K. L., & McGuire, K. T. (2005). The Judicial Branch. New York. Oxford
University Press.
Hetherington, M. J., & Smith, J. L. (2007). Issue Preferences and Evaluations of
the U.S. Supreme Court. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 71(1), 40–66.

	
  

87	
  

Hillygus, D. S., & Shields, T. G. (2005). Moral Issues and Voter Decision Making
in the 2004 Presidential Election. PS: Political Science & Politics, 38(02), 201–
209. doi:10.1017/S1049096505056301
Hoekstra, V. J. (1995). The Supreme Court and Opinion Change: An
Experimental Study of the Court’s Ability to Change Opinion. American
Politics Research, 23(1), 109–129.
Hoekstra, Valerie J.. Public Reaction to Supreme Court Decisions. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Print.
Holcomb, J., Gottfried, J., & Mitchell, A. (2013). News Use Across Social Media
Platforms. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved from
http://www.journalism.org/2013/11/14/news-use-across-social-mediaplatforms/
Holder, H. D., & Treno, A. J. (1997). Media Advocacy in Community Prevention:
News as a Means to Advance Policy Change. Addiction, 92(s2), S189–S199.
Human Rights Campaign. (2013). HRC Goes Viral. Human Rights Campaign.
Retrieved March 27, 2014, from http://www.hrc.org/viral
Human Rights Campaign. (2013) HRC’s Red Logo Campaign Takes Home a Mashie
Award. Human Rights Campaign. Retrieved March 27, 2014, from
https://www.hrc.org/blog/entry/hrcs-red-logo-campaign-takes-home-amashie-award
Iyengar, S., & Kinder, D. R. (2010). News That Matters: Television and American
Opinion, Updated Edition. University of Chicago Press.
Iyengar, S., Peters, M. D., & Kinder, D. R. (1982). Experimental Demonstrations of
the “Not-So-Minimal” Consequences of Television News Programs. The
American Political Science Review, 76(4), 848–858. doi:10.2307/1962976
Iyengar, S., & Simon, A. (1993). News Coverage of the Gulf Crisis and Public
Opinion A Study of Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing. Communication
Research, 20(3), 365–383. doi:10.1177/009365093020003002
Jacobs, L. (2004). Moral Values Takes Back Seat to Partisanship and the Economy
in the 2004 Presidential Election. Unpublished manuscript, University of
Minnesota. Retrieved March, 1, 2005.

	
  

88	
  

Jones, D. A. (2002). The Polarizing Effect of New Media Messages. International
Journal of Public Opinion Research, 14(2), 158–174. doi:10.1093/ijpor/14.2.158
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1973). On the Psychology of Prediction.
Psychological Review, 80(4), 237.
Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. (1982). Variants of Uncertainty. Cognition, 11(2),
143–157.
Keck, T. M. (2009). Beyond Backlash: Assessing the Impact of Judicial Decisions
on LGBT Rights. Law & Society Review, 43(1), 151–186.
Klarman, M. J. (2005). Brown and Lawrence (and Goodridge). Michigan Law
Review, 104(3), 431–489.
Klarman, M. J. (1994). Brown, Racial Change, and the Civil Rights Movement.
Virginia Law Review, 80(1), 7–150. doi:10.2307/1073592
Klarman, M. J. (1994). How Brown Changed Race Relations: The Backlash Thesis.
The Journal of American History, 81(1), 81–118. doi:10.2307/2080994
Knight, M. G. (1999). Getting Past the Impasse: Framing as a Tool for Public
Relations. Public Relations Review, 25(3), 381–398. doi:10.1016/S03638111(99)00016-8
Langer, G., & Cohen, J. (2005). Voters and Values in the 2004 Election. Public
Opinion Quarterly, 69(5), 744–759. doi:10.1093/poq/nfi060
Leighley, J. E. (2003). Mass Media and Politics: A Social Science Perspective.
Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publishing Company.
Lipka, M., & Sciupac E. (17 March 2014). Support for Gay Marriage Up Among
Black Protestants in Last Year, Flat Among White Evangelicals. Pew Research
Center. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2014/03/17/support-for-gay-marriage-up-among-black-protestantsin-last-year-flat-among-white-evangelicals/
Maccoby, N., & Markle, D. G. (1973). Chapter “Communication”. Handbook of
Communication, 153.
McCann, M. W. (1992). Reform Litigation on Trial. Law & Social Inquiry, 17(4),
715–743.
	
  

89	
  

McLeod, J. M., Scheufele, D. A., & Moy, P. (1999). Community, Communication,
and Participation: The Role of Mass Media and Interpersonal Discussion in
Local Political Participation. Political Communication, 16(3), 315–336.
doi:10.1080/105846099198659
McCombs, M. E., & Shaw, D. L. (1972). The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass
Media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. doi:10.1086/267990
Mendelsohn, H. (1973). Some Reasons Why Information Campaigns Can
Succeed. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 37(1), 50–61.
Meyer, D. S., & Boutcher, S. A. (2007). Signals and Spillover: Brown v. Board of
Education and Other Social Movements. Perspectives on Politics, 5(1), 81–93.
doi:10.1177/1532673X9502300106
Mitchell, A., & Guskin, E. (2013). Twitter News Consumers: Young, Mobile and
Educated. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved from
http://www.journalism.org/2013/11/04/twitter-news-consumers-youngmobile-and-educated/
Mitchell, A., Kiley, J., Gottfried, J., & Guskin, E. (2013). The Role of News on
Facebook. Pew Research Center’s Journalism Project. Retrieved from
http://www.journalism.org/2013/10/24/the-role-of-news-on-facebook/
Mondak, J. J. (1994). Policy Legitimacy and the Supreme Court: The Sources and
Contexts of Legitimation. Political Research Quarterly, 47(3), 675–692.
doi:10.1177/106591299404700306
Mondak, J. J., & Smithey, S. I. (1997). The Dynamics of Public Support for the
Supreme Court. The Journal of Politics, 59(04), 1114–1142.
doi:10.2307/2998595
Murphy, W. F., & Tanenhaus, J. (1968). Public Opinion and the United States
Supreme Court: Mapping of Some Prerequisites for Court Legitimation of
Regime Changes. Law and Society Review, 357-384.
Nelson, T. E., & Kinder, D. R. (1996). Issue Frames and Group-Centrism in
American Public Opinion. The Journal of Politics, 58(04), 1055–1078.
doi:10.2307/2960149
Neuman, W. R. (1981). Differentiation and Integration: Two Dimensions of
Political Thinking. American Journal of Sociology, 86(6), 1236–1268.
	
  

90	
  

Newman, N. (2009). The Rise of Social Media and its Impact on Mainstream
Journalism. Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism, 8(2), 1–5.
Parsell, M. (2008). Pernicious Virtual Communities: Identity, Polarisation and the
Web 2.0. Ethics and Information Technology, 10(1), 41–56. doi:10.1007/s10676008-9153-y
Persily, N. (2006). Gay Marriage, Public Opinion and the Courts. Scholarship at
Penn Law, 95.
Pew Research Center (17 January 2012). Super PACs Having Negative Impact,
Say Voters Aware of ’Citizens United’ Ruling. Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press. Retrieved from http://www.peoplepress.org/2012/01/17/super-pacs-having-negative-impact-say-votersaware-of-citizens-united-ruling/
Pew Research Center (4 February 2013). Facebook is a News Source for Many,
But Only Incidentally. Pew Research Center. Retrieved from
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/02/04/facebook-is-a-newssource-for-many-but-only-incidentally/
Pew Research Center (24 June 2013). Final Court Rulings: Public Equally
Interested in Voting Rights, Gay Marriage. Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press. Retrieved from http://www.peoplepress.org/2013/06/24/final-court-rulings-public-equally-interested-invoting-rights-gay-marriage/
Pew Research Center (1 July 2013). Public Divided Over Same-Sex Marriage
Rulings. Pew Research Center for the People and the Press. Retrieved from
http://www.people-press.org/2013/07/01/public-divided-over-same-sexmarriage-rulings/
Pew Research Center (10 March 2014). Changing Attitudes on Gay Marriage.
Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. Retrieved from
http://www.pewforum.org/2014/03/10/graphics-slideshow-changingattitudes-on-gay-marriage/
Pew Research Center (20 March 2013). Growing Support for Gay Marriage:
Changed Minds and Changing Demographics. Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press. Retrieved from http://www.peoplepress.org/2013/03/20/growing-support-for-gay-marriage-changed-mindsand-changing-demographics/
	
  

91	
  

Pew Research Center. (n.d.) Social Networking Fact Sheet. Pew Research Center’s
Internet & American Life Project. Retrieved April 3, 2014, from
http://www.pewinternet.org/fact-sheets/social-networking-fact-sheet/
Prior, M. (2005). News vs. Entertainment: How Increasing Media Choice Widens
Gaps in Political Knowledge and Turnout. American Journal of Political
Science, 49(3), 577–592. doi:10.1111/ajps.2005.49.issue-3
Ramirez, M. D. (2008). Procedural Perceptions and Support for the U.S. Supreme
Court. Political Psychology, 29(5), 675–698.
Rasinski, K. A. (1989). The Effect of Question Wording on Public Support for
Government Spending. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 53(3), 388–394.
Rosenberg, Gerald N.. The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?. 2nd
Edition. Chicago: University of Chicago, 2008. Print.
Scheufele, D. A. (2000). Agenda-Setting, Priming, and Framing Revisited:
Another Look at Cognitive Effects of Political Communication. Mass
Communication and Society, 3(2-3), 297–316.
doi:10.1207/S15327825MCS0323_07
Scheufele, D. A., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming:
The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models. Journal of Communication,
57(1), 9–20. doi:10.1111/j.1460-2466.2006.00326.x
Scott, K. M., & Saunders, K. L. (2006). Supreme Court Influence and the
Awareness of Court Decisions. In Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Retrieved from
http://www.kevinmscott.com/apsa06.pdf
Slotnick, E. E., & Segal, J. A. (1998). Television News and the Supreme Court: All the
News That’s Fit to Air? Cambridge University Press.
Smith, D. A., DeSantis, M., & Kassel, J. (2006). Same-Sex Marriage Ballot
Measures and the 2004 Presidential Election. State & Local Government
Review, 38(2), 78–91.
Stoutenborough, J. W., Haider-Markel, D. P., & Allen, M. D. (2006). Reassessing
the Impact of Supreme Court Decisions on Public Opinion: Gay Civil Rights
Cases. Political Research Quarterly, 59(3), 419–433.
doi:10.1177/106591290605900310
	
  

92	
  

Tewksbury, D., Weaver, A. J., & Maddex, B. D. (2001). Accidentally Informed:
Incidental News Exposure on the World Wide Web. Journalism & Mass
Communication Quarterly, 78(3), 533–554. doi:10.1177/107769900107800309
Tichenor, P. J., Donohue, G. A., & Olien, C. N. (1970). Mass Media Flow and
Differential Growth in Knowledge. The Public Opinion Quarterly, 34(2), 159–
170.
Ura, J. D. (2014). Backlash and Legitimation: Macro Political Responses to
Supreme Court Decisions. American Journal of Political Science, 58(1), 110–126.
Wagner, M. (2013, September 24). How HRC’s Marriage Equality Campaign Put
People First. Mashable. Retrieved June 24, 2014, from
http://mashable.com/2013/09/24/hrc-marriage-equality/
Walker, A. (27 February 2013) Trending Like Beyoncé: The Voting Rights Act. Bolder
Advocacy. Retrieved from http://bolderadvocacy.org/blog/trending-likebeyonce-advocacy-to-defend-the-voting-rights-act
Wegner, D. M. (1994). Ironic Processes of Mental Control. Psychological Review,
101(1), 34.
Weiss, J. A., & Tschirhart, M. (1994). Public Information Campaigns as Policy
Instruments. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 13(1), 82–119.
doi:10.2307/3325092

	
  

93	
  

